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Abstract
Corporate governance can play a significant role in financial market stability and
economic development. Corporate governance scholars have provided controversial
results with respect to the relationships between corporate governance and both corporate
financial performance and market value. Based on agency theory and institutional
theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value in Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia’s 116 firms from 2010 to 2014. Financial performance was measured by
return on assets and return on equity, while market value was measured by Tobin’s q.
Corporate governance mechanisms involved in this study were board size, board
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation. The
financial statements and corporate governance mechanisms collected from the websites
of sampled firms and the Saudi stock market (Tadawul). The findings of multiple
regression tests revealed a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and both corporate financial performance and market value.
This study may contribute to social change by building confidence in the Saudi capital
market and improving the lives of stakeholders and community in general. The results
may help business leaders understand the influence of corporate governance on their
firms’ success and the country’s growth. Academic researchers, investors, regulatory
bodies, practitioners, and experts in the area of corporate governance may benefit as well.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Many international leaders of known firms have been involved in famous
financial scandals, such as the leaders of Enron, Anderson, WorldCom, Xerox, Parmalat,
Merrill Lynch, Maxwell, Allied Irish Bank, and Sellafield (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014;
Cretu, 2012). The financial scandals caused stock markets to drop sharply, employees to
lose their jobs, capital providers to lose their investments, and tax collections to shrink.
A common cause for this failure resulted from weak internal control which arises from
poor corporate governance of organizations (Darus & Mohamed, 2011). Furthermore,
auditors’ failure to reveal inadequacies in financial records and increase reliability and
confidence in the use of financial reports was significant factor among these scandals
(Bonna, 2011). The financial scandals have placed a significant doubt on the abilities of
stock market authorities, policy makers, and professional accounting and auditing
associations to regulate the proper corporate behavior (Adegbite, 2012). These highprofile corporate failures intensified the debate on the effectiveness of corporate
governance as a tool for improving firm performance and protecting investors
(Mangunyi, 2011).
The financial scandals and several cases of corporate mismanagement have led to
increasing attention on corporate governance rules and regulations, in close relation with
business ethics issues (Mangunyi, 2011; Roudaki, 2013). In addition, the financial crises
have served as justification for new rules and legislations to regulate corporate
governance practices in developed and developing countries (Jen, 2014). The financial
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scandals and financial crises resulted in the legislators and regulators of most nations
seeking to strengthen and enhance their corporate governance rules and regulations,
disclosure, and transparency levels (Lopatta, & Kaspereit, 2014; Pandya, 2011; Sáenz
González & García-meca, 2014). For example, United States legislators enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. As per the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, stock exchanges’
administrators should impose corporate governance rules and regulations on listed
companies regarding audit independence, board independence, and reliability of
corporate disclosures (Ali, 2014; Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014).
The legislators of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) passed corporate governance
regulations in 2006. These regulations constitute the governing principles for all firms
listed on Saudi Capital Market-Tadawul (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations,
2006). The legislators and regulators of many other markets re-examined their legislation
and regulations within the framework of corporate governance, including developing
markets (Ergin, 2012; Logan & Gooden, 2014). The efficacy of corporate governance
regulations can be different in developed and developing countries due to the differences
in political, cultural, and economic backgrounds. The legislation of corporate governance
has evolved considerably, becoming the real addition that the companies’ managers and
board of directors can demonstrate, in disclosures to their stakeholders (Cretu, 2012).
Background of the Problem
The key objective of corporate governance is to achieve long-term stockholder
value, as the firms’ leaders adopting best practices in corporate governance may achieve
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better financial performance and market value for their companies (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi,
& Fadzil, 2014; Ghazali, 2010; Meesiri, 2014). A robust system of corporate governance
is considered an important tool for mitigating the conflict of interests between
stakeholders and management (Pandya, 2011). Researchers affirm that corporate
governance is acknowledged as a crucial element in financial markets stability and
economic development (Bonna, 2011; Mangunyi, 2011).
Corporate governance is needed to protect the interest of all stakeholders,
including shareholders. Corporate governance secures confidence for not only
shareholders, but also other stakeholders, such as (a) government, (b) employees, (c)
suppliers, and (d) customers in ensuring the firms’ leaders are accountable for their
decisions. Weak-governance companies have higher input costs, lower labor
productivity, lower equity return, lower value, and lower operating performance than
good-governance companies (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012). On the contrary, good corporate
governance guarantees that shareholders will get the best performance for their
investment, resulting in wealth increase and general economic growth (Cretu, 2012).
Corporate governance regulations include standards and rules for helping the
managers of publicly traded companies to ensure their adherence and compliance with
the best corporate governance practices and systems that would ensure the protection of
both shareholders’ rights and other stakeholders’ rights. These regulations alleviate the
conflict of interests between the principal and agent (KSA’s Corporate Governance
Regulations, 2006). Corporate governance monitors the relationship between the firms
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and all their stakeholders (Adiloglu &Vuran, 2012). Corporate governance consists of a
set of mechanisms for mitigating the principal-agent problem and improving
stockholders’ welfare (Ergin, 2012; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014). Although countries’
regulators and legislators have taken many measures to mitigate conflict of the interest,
financial crises, and corporate scandals, more research is needed (Ferreira Caixe &
Krauter, 2014; Starbuck, 2014).
The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate performance and
market value of corporations has gained widespread prominence in the stock market
economy (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012). Management scholars examined the relationship of
corporate governance with firm performance and market value. However, the findings
are mixed and not convergent (Mangunyi, 2011). Whether corporate governance
enhances company performance and market value is another question to which the
answer is not clear; with no concurrence among researchers (Ergin, 2012).
In this study, I sought to investigate the impact of corporate governance on both
corporate financial performance and market value of publicly listed companies in KSA to
identify whether strong corporate governance implementation leads to better financial
performance and market value. The pressing need for mitigating the conflict of interest
between management and different stakeholders, as well as restoring the reliability and
confidence in global financial markets support and motivate this study. The focus for this
study was on corporate governance mechanisms in areas of control and incentives, as
well as corporate financial performance and market value by examining the relationship
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between corporate governance, and financial performance and market value. The
findings from this study may be generalized to other publicly listed companies in KSA.
Problem Statement
Investors and regulators have become more interested in the rules and regulations
of corporate governance because of the high-profile collapse of a number of large
corporations in the last decade of the 20th century. In addition, the world financial crisis
of 2008 has led to a pressing need for establishing sound corporate governance practices
as an emergent demand (Pandya, 2011). Therefore, management scholars have focused
on the relationships between corporate governance and (a) financial performance, and (b)
company value (Dhamadasa, Gamage, & Herath, 2014). The general business problem is
that there is a lack of consensus with respect to the relationships between corporate
governance, and (a) financial performance, and (b) company value (Coskun & Sayilir,
2012; Mangunyi, 2011; Nicolaescu, 2012; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). These divergent
findings may undermine business leaders’ adherence and compliance with the best
corporate governance practices (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). The specific business problem
is that some business leaders of KSA publicly listed companies do not have sufficient
knowledge of the relationship between corporate governance, financial performance, and
market value to determine the relevance and importance of implementing corporate
governance rules and regulations.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between five mechanisms of corporate governance and (a) financial
performance, and (b) market value in KSA’s 116 companies for the time period 2010 to
2014. The corporate governance independent variables are (a) board size, (b) board
independence, (c) board committees, (d) shareholding ownership structure, and (e)
executive compensation. The dependent variables are corporate financial performance
and market value. The implications for positive social change include the potential
clarification of the importance of corporate governance on corporate financial
performance and market value. Findings from this study may help firms’ leaders and
boards to understand which variables influence their companies’ performance and market
value. Also, the legislators may benefit from the findings of this study in identifying the
corporate governance mechanisms that can promote economic growth for the benefit of
society.
Nature of the Study
There are three different types of approaches for conducting research: qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed methods (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). Qualitative
methodology is useful for exploring and understanding a corporate governance
phenomenon. However, qualitative methodology is less suitable for the purpose of this
study. Qualitative design findings cannot be replicated, and generalizations to broader
groups of organizations or people are limited (Tacq, 2011).
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The quantitative researcher focuses on testing hypotheses and theories.
Quantitative research is useful for answering questions ( a) how much, (b) how many, (c)
where, (d) who, and (e) what is the relationship between specific variables (independent
and dependent variables) (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). A quantitative method was the
most suitable for this study because the purpose of this study was to examine the
relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance and market
value of the publicly listed companies in KSA.
The correlational design was best for this study because the purpose for the study
was examining the relationship among known variables (Stanley, 2011). The correlation
design was chosen after careful consideration of other quantitative design choices.
Experimental design and quasi-experimental design were not appropriate for this study.
A characteristic of experimental design is to the identification of cause-and-effect
relationships. The advantage of experimental design is showing greater internal validity.
However, experimental design provides less external validity (Chan, Landry, & Tory,
2011).
Quasi-experimental design helps predict the casual effect of an intervention on a
target population of a study (Hamoudi & Dowd, 2013). The quasi-experimental design is
characterized by a control group and a treatment group. However, quasi-experiment does
not contain random assignment of participants to groups (Currie, Ray, & Neidell, 2011).
The quasi-experiment approach reduces threats to external validity as the natural
environments do not face the same issues related to artificiality as compared to a well-
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controlled laboratory setting. However, the quasi-experiment approach increases threats
to internal validity because the treatment and control groups may not be comparable at
starting point (D'Onofrio, Lahey, Turkheimer, & Lichtenstein, 2013).
Research Questions
The purpose of research is to find answers to research questions (Berete, 2011).
Researchers repeatedly pose a question regarding whether the proper implementation of
corporate governance improves financial performance and market value of firms (Berete,
2011; Schultes, 2011). In this study, data on corporate governance mechanisms,
corporate financial performance, and market value were analyzed to answer specific
research questions. Financial performance was measured by two different measures,
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), while market value was measured by
Tobin’s q (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). The research questions are
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees and
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
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RQ5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA?
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA?
RQ7: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ8: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and market
value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ9: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ10: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ11: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and market value for publicly listed companies in
KSA?
RQ12: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
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Hypotheses
Hypotheses are assertions of what the answers of the study’s research questions
will be (Schultes, 2011). I sought to test the following hypotheses based on the theory
and empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance (independent
variables) and companies’ performance and companies’ values (dependent variables).
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and financial performance.
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance
and financial performance.
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board size and
financial performance.
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and
financial performance.
H03: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board
independence and financial performance.
Ha3: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees and
financial performance.
H04: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board committees
and financial performance.
Ha4: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees and
financial performance.
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H05: There is not a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and financial performance.
Ha5: There is a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and financial performance.
H06: There is not a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and financial performance.
Ha6: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and financial performance.
H07: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and market value.
Ha7: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance
and market value.
H08: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board size and
market value.
Ha8: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and market
value.
H09: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board
independence and market value.
Ha9: There is a statistically significant relationship between board independence
and market value.
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H010: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board
committees and market value.
Ha10: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees
and market value.
H011: There is not a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and market value.
Ha11: There is a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and market value.
H012: There is not a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and market value.
Ha12: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and market value.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study was based on two theories: agency theory
and institutional theory. An agency problem arises when there is imperfect alignment of
interest between the principal (shareholder or owner) and the agent (managers). If there
is a conflict of interest between the two parties, the wealth and welfare of the
shareholders and other stakeholders are not maximized. Managers need to be
compensated for maximizing the wealth and welfare such that they also benefit from
good corporate performance and market value (Schultes, 2011). Jensen and Meckling
(1976) presented the agency theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance, which
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identifies governance mechanisms that can minimize the conflict of interests resulting
from the separation of ownership and management of firm resources (Syriopoulos &
Tsatsaronis, 2012). The major focus of corporate governance mechanisms is to design
effective corporate control to assure executives act in the best interest of stakeholders
(Awotundum, Kehinde, & Somoye, 2011). However, agency theory does not cover
corporate governance fully; combining the agency theory with institution theory
establishes a foundation that redefines the model of corporate governance (Al Mamun,
Yasser, & Rahman, 2013).
There are multiple roots of the institutional theory, but the principal contributors
to the development of institutional theory were DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The
proponents of institutional theory posit that executives seek the support and endorsement
of a wide group of stakeholders for gaining legitimacy for their firms. Internal and
external stakeholders exert pressure on firm’s leaders by assessing its conformity and
adherence to existing rules and laws and their own value systems. Therefore, firms gain
legitimacy when its goals and activities confirm and adhere to stakeholders’ goals and
expectations (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013). The role of
institutions’ leaders in a country’s economy is to mitigate both information and
transaction costs by mitigating uncertainty and establishing proper structure that
facilitates the interactions among firms (Yi, Liu, He, & Li, 2012). The enforcement of
the rules and regulations positively affect the corporate performance (Al Mamun et al.,
2013).

14
The emphasis of agency theory is on the management ethics; while the emphasis
of institutional theory is on the formation of social culture of firm life (Yi et al., 2012).
Corporate governance mainly depends on the large environments within which business
leaders behave; these include the legislative environment, such as the stakeholders’
protection laws, and enforcement and compliance capabilities (Adegbite, 2012). The
focus of agency theory is the management and principles for stakeholders’ protection;
while the focus of institutional theory is the rules and regulations for monitoring and
controlling firms, and enforcement of these rules and regulations (Al Mamun et al.,
2013).
Bonna (2011) concluded that corporate governance mechanisms may help
improve company financial performance and market value, and mitigate financial risk in
publicly listed companies. In consistency with agency theory, the weakness of corporate
governance system leads to the conflict of interests and opportunistic actions by
managers, while sound corporate governance aligns the interests between the principal
and the agent, which may result in better performance of firms. Thus, it is hypothesized
that robust corporate governance system may positively affect both corporate
performance and market value.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions are the key terms within this study:
Board committees: Committees are specialized in specific functions such as
auditing (audit committee), structuring the executive compensation (nomination and
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remuneration committee) and assuring compliance with corporate governance best
practice (compliance committee) or risk evaluation (risk committee). Firms may create
other committees depending on their particular needs and challenges (Przybylowski,
Aluchna, & Zamojska, 2011).
Board of directors: Board is the link between people who supply the capital (the
shareholders or investors) and the people who use and invest the capital to create value
(the managers) (Przybylowski et al., 2011).
Board independence: All or most of a board’s members do not have a
relationship with the company except as executives (Pandya, 2011).
Board size: Board size is the number of the board of directors’ members of a
company elected by the shareholders, including independent and non-independent
members (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).
Corporate governance: Governance is the system of internal controls and
procedures by which individual companies are managed. Corporate governance provides
a framework that specifies the rights, and roles and responsibilities of different groups,
such as management, and the board and shareholders within an organization
(Awotundum et al., 2011).
Executive compensation: Compensation is total payments in the form of salary,
bonuses, and stock options for services provided by corporate managers (Bonna, 2011;
Lin, 2010).
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Financial performance: A measure of how well a company can utilize assets
from its primary activity of a business and yield profits for investors; it is a measure of a
company’s effectiveness (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2010).
Governance index: The G-Index (GI) is the total of one point for the existence or
the absence of each provision (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).
Market value of equity: The total dollar market value of all of a firm's outstanding
shares, common and preferred shares; it is synonym for market capitalization (Coskun &
Sayilir, 2012).
Ownership structure: Ownership structure is one of the most important corporate
governance mechanisms, which includes level of equity, nature of equity, and the checkand-balance of the shareholding structure (Mangunyi, 2011).
Tobin’s q: Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus total book value of
liabilities divided by total book value of assets (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions are facts considered to be true, but are not actually verified.
Assumptions carry risk and should be treated as such. Researchers make assumptions
about phenomenon and theory under investigation, the instrument, the method of
analysis, the methodology, the sample, and the results (Simon, 2011). Limitations refer
to potential weaknesses of the study. Limitations are those items the researcher cannot
control and monitor (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013). Delimitations refer to the
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bounds or scope of the study (Simon, 2011). The delimitations are related to theories,
practices, and business problem (Simon, 2011).
Assumptions
The first assumption was corporate governance standards are more organized and
sustainable in developed countries as compared to developing countries where political,
cultural, and economic backgrounds are sufficient. Corporate governance in developing
countries is not mature and sound, because of the lack of professional management
strategies and investment confidence. The data in this study were gathered from existing
data sets. The data were secondary and not originally intended for this study. Therefore,
the second assumption for this study was that the business leaders of the firms under
study reported honest, complete, and accurate data for the subject study period. The third
assumption was the theoretical framework based on agency theory and institutional
theory was relevant for the phenomenon of corporate governance under study in Saudi
publicly listed companies.
Limitations
This study contained several potential limitations. The first potential limitation of
this study was the use of the available existing data that were not originally intended for
this study. The secondary data could be a potential source of errors, which may hamper
the findings to be generalized to all publicly listed companies. Overcoming this
limitation requires using various data sources, such as (a) companies’ websites, (b)
annual reports, and (c) Saudi stock market’s website (Tadawul). Data triangulation can

18
eliminate or minimize such limitation through using various data sources, rather than a
single data source (Bonna, 2011).
A second limitation of this study was related to variables measurements. The
financial performance and market value of companies were precisely considered financial
indicators exclusively. Academic researchers do not concur on specific measures
assessing financial performance and market value.
A third limitation was related to this proposed study’s focus. The focus of this
study was on the internal processes of a firm, rather than external factors. Along with
internal factors, external factors have a significant effect on firm financial performance.
Interest rate policy, foreign exchange, macro economy, and inflation may have a more
significant impact on firm financial performance than on how a firm is regulated and
monitored internally. Therefore, the researchers should not compare findings from this
study with previous researchers who addressed the relationships being studied.
Delimitations
The purpose of this study was investigating the relationship between corporate
governance on both financial performance and market value of companies. The focus of
this study was on the traded companies in KSA for the years 2010- 2014. Only the
companies with availability of both corporate governance and financial data throughout
the study period were examined. The variables of corporate governance were limited to
(a) board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) ownership structure, (e)
and executive compensation. Financial performance was represented by only ROA and
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ROE, while market value was restricted to Tobin’s q. The purpose of the research did not
include identifying the causation of financial performance or market values of the
corporations.
Significance of the Study
Corporate governance systems are important and necessary for contemporary
business environment, because accounting standards, legislation, and economic theories
are not effective in mitigating the conflict of interests between firms’ managers and
stakeholders. In addition, rules and regulations of corporate governance may enhance a
firm’s financial performance and market value in pubic listed companies (Bonna, 2011).
The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance systems can be different in
developed and developing stock markets, such as Middle East markets. This difference is
because of the disparate international corporate governance structures resulting from
dissimilar regulatory, economic, and social conditions (Rouf, 2011). Accordingly, the
result of implementing corporate governance in both types of markets may be different.
The benefits gained from a particular corporate governance practices vary depending on
company and country characteristics (Ionescu, 2012).
Contribution to Business Practice
The focus of this study was on examining the relationship of corporate
governance with both financial performance and market value of publicly listed
companies in KSA. Based on the robust procedures of this study, the results can be
generalized to other companies in KSA. The financial performance and market value
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directly affect the investment return of the shareholders and accordingly impact
shareholders’ wealth. Also, the financial performance and market value affect the
strategic decisions of the firms’ leaders in investing their firm’s resources. Shareholders’
wealth is the appropriate goal for the leaders of any for-profit company. There is a
positive and often direct relationship between corporate financial performance and stock
price, and consequently shareholder wealth. When a firm’s managers try to maximize the
wealth of their shareholders, managers are trying to increase the firm’s stock price
(Berthelot, Morris, & Morrill, 2010). Sound corporate governance practices and policies
can play an important role in improving corporate financial performance and market
value (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012).
Furthermore, firms’ leaders can use the findings of this study to reduce
investment risk and increase investor confidence in companies’ performance. Business
leaders can differentiate their companies and send credible signals to attract investors by
self-adopting good corporate governance practices and policies. Business leaders may
reduce the cost of capital, and enhance market value and reputation for their companies,
and raise the fund required for operation and expansion when improving companies’
corporate governance practices (Ionescu, 2012). Based on this study’s findings, the
concerned parties of corporate governance can build a corporate governance model,
which maximizes the companies’ values and protects stakeholders’ rights.
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Implications for Social Change
At the community or society level, the business leaders and regulators can benefit
from the study’s findings to fight corruption, encourage more investments, and develop
capital markets. The protection of the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests is
one of the important factors for creating efficient and competitive stock markets, as well
as maximize the benefits of the countries’ citizens (Koncevičienė, Ščebrina-Dalibagienė,
& Levišauskaitė, 2012). Corporate leaders and regulators can use the findings of this
study to build a corporate governance model, which protect stakeholders’ rights and
reduce bankruptcies. Thus, promoting and implementing good corporate governance, as
well as utilizing the study’s findings can affect a country’s financial stability, leading to
affecting its economic growth.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
Because of increasing demand of corporate governance rules and regulations, and
the pressure put on the business leaders to address firms’ economic and social effects, the
academic literature of corporate governance has expanded in the last decade of the 20th
century. The key purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of relevant
previous and current studies addressing the importance of corporate governance and its
relationship with corporate financial performance and market value. This literature
review is focused on research that supports the research questions, hypotheses, and
theoretical framework.
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The searching strategy was focused on peer-reviewed references that were within
5 years of expected CAO approval of the completed study. I collected the references that
support this study using several methods. Relevant articles and dissertations were
obtained from data bases such as Business Source Premier, Academic Source Premier,
ABI/INFORM, and ProQuest Central. Relevant books were collected through college
libraries.
The review of the professional and academic literature heading is organized into
six principal headings: (a) corporate governance theories and their assumptions, as well
as their strengths and weaknesses, (b) the concepts and definition of corporate
governance, (c) the practices of corporate governance in developing countries and KSA,
(d) corporate governance mechanisms (independent variables) and practices in both
developed and emerging markets, (e) exploring the different corporate governance
indexes, and (f) the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
dependent variables: firm performance and market value. This study contains 158
references, of which 136 references were published within 5 years of expected CAO
approval of the completed study. Peer-reviewed references are 100% of the total study’s
references. Frequently used search terms included (a) corporate governance, (b)
corporate governance mechanisms, (c) corporate governance theories, (d) financial
performance, (e) market value, (f) developing countries, (g) developed countries, (h)
KSA, and (i) publicly listed companies.
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Corporate Governance Theories
In this section, some of the corporate governance theories, especially agency
theory and institutional theory as the basis of the theoretical framework of this study, are
reviewed for understanding how they relate to corporate governance. Researchers
developed several theories that highlight the key objectives of the company and how the
company meets its obligations and responsibilities toward stakeholders. Corporate
governance started from agency theory and based on emerging problems and issues; other
theories such as stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, and resource
dependency theory are developed (Htay, Salman, & Meera, 2013). In this study, the
discussion of corporate governance theories included the five key theories that affected
the development of corporate governance: agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship
theory, institutional theory, and resource dependency theory.
Agency theory. The proponents of agency theory specify a contract that abides
owners and executives as a principal-agent relationship. As per this contract, managers
have one objective, that of serving and satisfying the interests of owners. Accordingly,
any deviation away from this contractual relationship results in an agency problem
(Ngoungo, 2012). Thus, agency problem arises when the welfare of a person (agent)
depends on another (principal). Agency problems arise when management set some
goals contradicting of those owners.
As the agent is a person that act on behalf of the principal and the principal is the
person affects the action. The executives of the companies can pursue their interests even
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to the detriment of shareholders’ interests which becomes a problem. The executives
have superior information and may exploit the company resources for achieving their
own goals and lower the owners’ profits (Pelayo-Maciel, Calderon-Hernandez, & SernaGomez, 2012). When executives’ stakes are low, there exists a greater probability that
the executives involve themselves in value decreasing works. Accordingly, executives
tend to conceal information from the shareholders and take decisions to pursue their
interests. Thus, the proponents of agency theory believe that the management is not
always likely to behave and act in the best interest of the owners (Al Mamun et al.,
2013); those scholars focus on that management is self-serving (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju,
2011).
The interest of the agency theory proponents is how to minimize the conflict of
interests resulting from the separation of ownership and management of firm resources
(Habbash, Lijuan, Salama, & Dixon, 2014). The objective is to resolve conflict of
interests not only between the shareholders and management, but also between all
external and internal stakeholders, thereby improving firm performance and shareholder’s
wealth (Nuryanah & Islam, 2011). In the most cases, the divergence of interests between
the principal and agent is due to lack of corporate governance mechanisms for efficient
and effective control, and approval and sanctioning of management decisions (Ongore &
Kobonyo, 2011).
An agent cannot be trusted; therefore monitoring mechanisms are substantial to
mitigate the conflict of interests between an agent and principal (Darus & Mohamed,

25
2011). Sound control over management actions would reduce agency problems, and
enhance company performance and market value. There is a pressing need for corporate
governance mechanisms to control management’s behaviors and actions to protect
shareholders’ interests and align these interests with management’s interests
(Dimitropoulos & Tsagkanos, 2012).
The proponents of agency theory spell out corporate governance mechanisms that
can minimize conflict of interests between the agent and principal, which include
incentive schemes for executives to reward them financially for maximizing
shareholders’ interests and wealth. The most famous incentive schemes include such
things as bonuses, stock options, and prerequisites, which are related to long-term value
maximization of the company and shareholder wealth (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).
Monitoring and reward structures are meant to align the interests of owners with the
incentives of management (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 2011). Furthermore, to ensure capital is
applied to its intended purpose and improve its control, shareholders choose individuals
from their rank to represent them on the board of directors (Mangunyi, 2011).
Shareholders (principals) incur agency cost for reducing the failings of
management and board by hiring external auditors to control management actions that are
approved by the board (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011). Owners bear agency cost to
overcome management opportunistic activities (Samaha & Abdallah, 2012). Thus,
agency cost occurs from the misalignment of interests between the owners and
management (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). This cost can reach the lowest level, if there is
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close alignment between the goals of principal and agent (Gherghina, Vintila, & Tibulca,
2014; Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012).
Stakeholder theory. The concept of stakeholders has gained widespread
popularity among scholars, corporate executives, and media. Stakeholders are any
individual or group who are affected or can affect the achievement of the firm objectives
(Al Mamun et al., 2013). Stakeholders can include shareholders, suppliers, customers,
employees, lenders, governments, local charities, and various interest groups.
Stakeholder theory balances between the interests of firm stakeholders and their
satisfaction. The proponents of stakeholder theory require firm managers to design and
implement proper methodologies to identify the nature of the relationship between the
managers and interested parties to achieve their goals. The economic value for any firm
is created by parties who voluntarily come together, coordinate, cooperate, and then
improve and enhance everyone’s circumstances (Mangunyi, 2011). The proponents of
stakeholder theory clarified the awareness of stakeholders’ perspectives and
organizational justice on the equity of corporate governance. Stakeholder theory
challenges the assumption that corporate governance aligns between shareholders, of
being residual risk-takers (Mason & Simmons, 2014).
Different scholars have given different definitions of stakeholder theory. The
wider and more balanced definition considers stakeholders as those groups who are vital
to the success and survival of the firm (Al Mamun et al., 2013). This definition is
corporation oriented and is considered as part of a larger social system. Business leaders
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should provide to all stakeholders, directly or indirectly affect the survival of the firm,
how the firm is affecting them (Al Mamun et al., 2013).
Stakeholder theory is a combination of philosophical ideas from law, ethics, and
economics. The proponents of stakeholder theory extend the responsibility of the
management toward corporate social responsibility, profit maximization, and business
morality (Htay et al., 2013). Despite stakeholder theory is useful in developing and
maintaining good relationships with stakeholders through disclosing necessary
information, which reduce an agency problem, the academic scholars do not state the
type of information should be disclosed. Stakeholder theory provides management a
greater capability and more resources to face firms’ internal problem (Al Mamun et al.,
2013).
Stewardship theory. Stewardship theory evolved from psychology and
sociology; while agency theory had its origin in economics (Al Mamun et al., 2013). The
proponents of stewardship theory assume that management aspires to high objectives by
high levels of responsibility and achievement, and self-motivation, as well as protecting
the firm through collective actions. Under stewardship theory, management acts
selflessly for the benefits of the firm and owners (Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012).
Also, the proponents of this theory assume that the key duty of management is
maximizing company performance and market value; thereby creating more benefits for
steward and principal (Al Mamun et al., 2013). According to this definition,
management is defined as steward who works for the principal. In another perspective,
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stewardship theory is defined as act or behavior that spells out the long-run interest of the
firm, as well as owners a head of individuals' self-interest. Management plays its role as
steward by aligning its own benefit and interest along with the firm objectives.
Accordingly, the management aims to protect the principals and make profits for them,
while in agency theory, corporate leaders work for their self-interest (Al Mamun et al.,
2013).
Under stewardship theory, the principal empowers management with the
information, equipment, and power assuming that the best interests of the firm are
achieved (Al Mamun et al., 2013). The principal should ignore the assumptions resulting
from agency theory and build a trusting relationship with the steward to avoid any
monitoring and control structure. Lack of trust with respect to ethical behavior and
authority is replaced, which is one of the main distinguishing assumptions and features of
stewardship theory (Mangunyi, 2011). Giving full authority helps management make
decisions independently for the best interest of the company (Al Mamun et al., 2013).
Under agency theory, the effectiveness of the board of directors is achieved by
the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions. On the contrary, in stewardship
theory CEO duality may be a good corporate governance practice with positive
consequences for firm financial performance, because of integration and unification of
the authority chain, leading to faster decision making process (Vintila & Gherghina,
2012). Accordingly, the interests of CEOs and principals are aligned, and CEOs
endeavor to balance the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders and seek to
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make decisions for their benefits (Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012). Thus, companies that
espouse CEO duality achieve faster, better, and more efficient decisions. This is because
the executives are inherently trustworthy and good stewards of the firm assets and
resources (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). Therefore, there is no problem resulting from
management’s motivations as stewardship run companies outperform other firms
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). However, according to KSA’s Corporate
Governance Regulations (2006), the combination of chairman post and any executive
position, such as CEO, managing director, or general manager, is strictly prohibited.
Institutional theory. The proponents of institutional theory address the
uncertainties of firm transactions between economic agents. (Al Mamun et al., 2013).
The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both information and transaction costs
by eliminating uncertainty and establishing proper structure that facilitates the
interactions between firms. This gives corporations the equal opportunity for an active
role in an institutional environment if enterprises have the ability to move beyond
institutional constraints. Institutional environment is defined as a set of legal, social,
economic, and political conventions that create the foundational basis for producing
product, services, and exchange (Yi et al., 2012). This environment as an external factor
is very important for companies in a transition economy (Yi et al., 2012).
According to institutional theory, the corporation is not just a place where
operations happen; rather these are also cultural and social systems (Yi et al., 2012).
Accordingly, the firm cannot survive without legitimacy. The perspective of institutional
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theory is best met in an environment with high levels of efficient legislations. Thus,
corporate governance is considered as an institutional arrangement by which investors
ensure an adequate return on their investment. The key feature of institutional theory is
the openness about firm practices and human behavior. The formation of social culture
of the firm is an important factor in institutional theory (Yi et al., 2012).
Resource dependency theory. Resource dependency theory was developed by
Pfeffer (1972), which posited that companies depend on one another for getting the
required resources; thereby links are created (Ovidiu-Niculae, Lucian, & Cristiana, 2012).
Multiple firms create and maintain social relationship for the continuance of this
interlocking directorship. This directorship can be achieved by a person who is a
member of the boards of both firms. The unique combination of the quality of top
management and wide experience and expertise of the board would positively affect the
strategic decision making, leading to better performance of the organization (OvidiuNiculae et al., 2012). According to this theory, there are motivations and incentives for a
company to create linkages with outside parties, as this help to reduce the environmental
uncertainties the company faces. The companies will consider the advantages of linking
and engaging in open dialogue by taking into account the costs and direct benefits
associated with their decisions due to their commitment to dialogue. Also, companies
that have a good relationship with the key stakeholders can create value for the
companies and reduce their risks. Accordingly, companies with strong relationship with
stakeholders face less uncertainty (Rehbein, Logsdon, & Buren, 2013).
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More powerful firms want to monitor and control their external environments and
possess greater power to form their response to the social issue than less powerful firms.
Companies with these combined factors are in a sound position to solve tough issues such
as human rights issues, labor problems, and environmental codes and social
responsibilities without having to worry about the negative reaction from other
stakeholders (Rehbein et al., 2013). Under resource dependency theory, a board with a
high level of connections to the external environment would improve and ease access to
valuable resources, such as finance and capital, improving corporate governance practices
(Vo & Nguyen, 2014).
A corporate board role in developing access to required resources is a factor of the
resource dependency theory (Rehbein et al., 2013). The proponents of both stakeholder
theory and resource dependence theory assert the involvement of the board members in
decision making through the service roles of the board. Stewardship theory authors
describe board of directors’ involvement in both decision control and decision
management through the strategic roles of the board; whereas the legalistic perspective
reflects board of directors’ involvement in decision management through the execution of
decision control roles (Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012; Pfeffer, 1972). Academic scholars
criticized both resource dependence theory and stewardship theory over time. Resource
dependency theory is criticized for not focusing on the decision making and internal
process, while stewardship theory is questioned for its lack of details about board of
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directors activities, as well as not describing how firm directors take their decisions
(Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012).
In summary, corporate governance theories have been used in developing the best
practices and mechanisms of corporate governance (Htay et al., 2013). There is no
corporate governance theory that is valid and applicable all the times and in all
circumstances. There is no one ideal corporate governance theory, but a combination of
two or more theories can provide the business requirements and maintain the firm
operational, while aligning the interests of both principal and management (Al Mamun et
al., 2013).
The Concepts and Definitions of Corporate Governance
In the last decade of the 20th century, corporate governance gained high
importance and discussed not only in the finance literature, but also in other academic
literature in terms of ownership structure of the company, economic efficiency and
product market competition, international context, and general discussion (Kim, 2011).
Corporate governance arises when the firm faces agency conflict between the
shareholders and managers. The efficient contract between the two parties is not enough
to remove that conflict of interest (Martani & Saputra, 2009). Corporate governance is a
vital tool used by companies’ leaders to solve the conflict of interest by convention.
Through corporate governance, business leaders lay down strategic targets and goals of
the firm; corporate governance helps leaders decrease the operational risk of the firm to
the lowest level through the efficient internal and external controls (Kim, 2011).
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Corporate governance includes the rules, regulations, and mechanisms a
company’s managers adopt to manage interests and conflicts of corporate outsiders
(customers, suppliers, shareholders, society, state, peers) and insiders (employees,
managers, executive directors), company value maximization, and aiming agency conflict
minimization (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). The structure of corporate governance
includes law and regulation, corporate charter, board control internal control, and market
control (Martani & Saputra, 2009). Stronger rule of law and investor protection are
related to corporate governance practices and company performance (Awotundum et al.,
2011). The quality of corporate governance in the developed and developing countries
mostly depends on the regulatory framework (Koncevičienė et al., 2012). Corporate
governance practices rely on company and country characteristics (Ibrahim, Rehman, &
Raoof, 2010).
The sound and proper corporate governance may prevent controlling shareholders
and misbehavior of company management, and reduce the risk to small investors. Firms
without controlling group may adopt higher quality corporate governance. The
enhancement and improvement by lawmakers and regulatory authorities of corporate
governance rules, regulations, and practices are widely recognized as a significant
element in strengthening and improving the foundation for the long-term and short-term
economic performance of countries and organizations. Corporate governance system can
be divided into two main categories: Insider system and outsider system. There is a
conflict of interest between weak and strong shareholders in the insider system, while in
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the outsider system the conflict of interest is between strong managers and widely
dispersed shareholders (Ibrahim et al., 2010). Corporate governance system has two key
objectives: The first objective is integrity management, while the second one is guidance
to maximize the created value for shareholders (Bostan & Grosu, 2010).
Sound corporate governance gives important benefits to countries and firms.
From the country’s point of view, well-organized corporate governance increases the
image and reputation of the country, attracts foreign capitals, and prevents capital flights.
It also increases the competitiveness of capital market and economy, ends crisis in a
minimum damage, helps distribute resources more effectively, and provides and
maintains high welfare (Dagli, Eyuboglu, & Ayaydin, 2012).
When it comes to firm’s perspective, robust corporate governance means
decreasing the cost of capital, and increasing liquidity and opportunities of finance. Also,
good corporate governance helps firms overcome crisis easily. Firms with wellorganized corporate governance have more success than other firms (Murcia, Murcia,
Rover, & Borba, 2014; Zeitoun, Osterloh, & Frey, 2014). Investors are ready for paying
a higher price for the shares of firms which adopt well-organized corporate governance
(Dagli et al., 2012). Sound corporate governance may improve the corporate financial
performance and the market value in the longer term without endangering the
sustainability of the firm. It also helps solve the conflict of interests between the firms
and the stakeholders who are related with the firm (Dagli et al., 2012). Finally, the
effectiveness of corporate governance mainly depends on the effective operation and
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decisions of the board of directors and the power exercised by investors or shareholders
(Ngoungo, 2012).
However, there is a threat of overregulation by governments. The overregulation
may not always lead to the desired results in terms of economic and corporate stability,
and effective performance and higher market value of the firm. The corporate
governance can be more costly than the targeted benefits and can also hinder or limit
managerial freedom of initiative, leading to negative performance (Koncevičienė et al.,
2012; Meesiri, 2014).
Corporate governance concepts. For a better understanding of the legal systems
of the corporate governance in both developed and emerging markets, it is necessary to
understand the concept of corporate governance. Corporate governance is a formal
distribution of power between three main parties: The board of directors, managers, and
shareholders for assuring that the decisions of management do not conflict with the
shareholder interest (Ngoungo, 2012). The main concern of corporate governance system
is managing the relationship among various corporate stakeholders.
There are narrow and broad concepts of corporate governance (Pandya, 2011;
Rahim & Alam, 2014). In a narrow concept, corporate governance includes a set of
relationships among the company’s shareholders, board of directors, management,
auditors, and others (Pandya, 2011). In the broad concept, corporate governance is the
extent to which firms are run in an honest and open manner, which is important for the
efficiency of capital allocation, overall market confidence, and development of the
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overall wealth and welfare of the countries (Fülöp, 2014; Pandya, 2011). Both concepts
result in efficient and effective allocation of resources (Pandya, 2011)
Corporate governance can be approached through two other different
perspectives: A restraint approach and a large approach. In a restraint approach,
corporate governance can be defined as the totality of legislative and economic means,
which helps achieve the owners’ interests (Cretu, 2012). Accordingly, the types of
investments in any country have a significant part in the orientation of balanced and
powerful corporate governance. In a wider perspective, corporate governance represents
the totality of mechanisms and control norms applied to harmonize and protect the
interests of all the firm’s stakeholders (Cretu, 2012; Velte, 2014). The studies conducted
by World Bank considered the larger approach of corporate governance, considering the
main stakeholders of the firm without focusing on the relationships between managers
and owners (Cretu, 2012). The philosophy of corporate governance depends on the
disclosures and transparency that improve the trust in firms by increasing public
confidence in those companies. Sound corporate governance refers to a trend toward
greater and more binding corporate responsibility, as well as conducting a business as per
the acceptable ethical principles and standards of the country (Abels & Martelli, 2011).
As a result, firms safeguard stakeholder’s rights and focus on better operational and
financial performance.
Corporate governance definitions. There is no standard definition of corporate
governance among the researchers; rather management scholars have defined corporate
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governance in different ways and relate their definitions to specific aspects of corporate
governance (Onakoya, Fasanya, & Ofoegbu, 2014; Talamo, 2011). However, based on
the literature review and contemporary studies of the various definitions of corporate
governance, two main sets of corporate governance definitions are classified. The first
set of definitions that identify behavioral patterns of firms with regard to financial
structure, growth, efficiency, performance, and relations with stakeholders and
shareholders (Talamo, 2011). The second set of definitions that identify the normative
framework in terms of rules and regulations governing, controlling, supervising and
influencing the corporate activity (Ferreira Caixe et al., 2014; Man, 2013). There exists
an overlap between the two sets. For the purpose of this study, a variety of corporate
governance definitions were discussed, in particular, those that are consistent with agency
theory and institutional theory.
The majority of definitions relate corporate governance to supervision and control
of the management or of the firm, or of the managerial behavior (Talamo, 2011). The
term of corporate governance means the control mechanism governing the management
activities monitored by board of directors (Abels & Martelli, 2011). Corporate
governance is defined as a system by which firms are controlled and directed
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). This traditional approach has ignored the unique
influence that shareholders exert on the board of directors and by extension, the
management, to behave in a particular way in their interest (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).
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Therefore, scholars have defined corporate governance in different ways to avoid the
criticisms to the traditional approach (Rambo, 2013).
Corporate governance is defined as a system of rules and regulations that are
likely to be institutional market in the area arising or pursuing different categories of
management, shareholders, stakeholders, customers, personnel dependent public, and so
on (Bostan & Grosu, 2010). The company leaders must practice sound corporate
governance to get a better financial return in the future. Similarly, corporate governance
is defined as a system by which firms are directed, monitored, controlled, and governed
through the distribution of rights and responsibilities of different people in the firm such
as the board of directors, shareholders, stakeholders, and managers (Pelayo-Maciel et al.,
2012). The focus of this definition is that companies are controlled and governed,
especially the relationship between shareholders and companies’ leaders.
Also, corporate governance is defined as a set of rules and norms that monitor the
relationship among principals and agents of the firm, the employees, governments,
creditors, and other stakeholders relating to the rights and responsibilities (Nuryaman,
2012). This definition focuses on the system that regulates the firm by which business is
directed and controlled. Furthermore, corporate governance refers to the collection of
institutions, policies, and rules influencing how a company is managed and controlled
(Donaldson, 2012). Ccorporate governance is considerably depends on the large
environments within which companies work; these include the legislative environment,
such as the enforcement capabilities and efficiency of the judiciary, shareholder
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protection laws, and the general environmental support for business (Adegbite, 2012).
This group of definitions focuses on corporate governance as a system by which a firm is
governed, monitored, and controlled for identifying responsibilities and rights among
different participants in that firm, thus achieving the interest of the different stakeholders
of a firm.
Another definition, which is the most widely used one, is that OECD defined
corporate governance as distribution of rights and responsibilities among different levels
in the firm, such as (a) shareholders, (b) managers, (c) directors, and (d) other interested
parties in the company performance; identifying the rules and procedures improves the
right decisions on firm’s activities and affairs (Dagli et al., 2012; Jen, 2014). According
to this definition, corporate governance should provide the proper structure that set the
objectives of the firm and the means of achieving those objectives, as well as to
determine performance monitoring. Thereafter, OECD defined corporate governance as
a key element in enhancing and improving economic efficiency, and growth, as well as
enhancing investor confidence in firm performance. Corporate governance system
comprises a set of relationships between firm’s management, shareholders, board, and
other stakeholders, as well as providing the structure that lays down firms objectives and
the procedures of achieving those objectives and controlling performance (Dagli et al.,
2012).
Other management scholars defined corporate governance as the set of
mechanisms, both institutional and market-based, that affect the directors of a company
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to determine the right decisions that maximize the performance and market value of the
company for its shareholders (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). In other words, corporate
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of funds to firms confirm obtaining a
proper return on their investments. This definition of corporate governance is based on
the principal-agent relationship and agency theory, which contends that the delegation of
management authorities and responsibilities by the shareholder to the managers creates
problem of moral hazard and adverse selection that lead to agency cost (Berthelot et al.,
2010). Thus, the composition, size, and involvement of the board of directors are
significant in corporation activities.
Another definition, corporate governance is defined as a structure and processes
by which the management of firm business is performed for improving corporate
accountability and business prosperity, as well as improving the investor’s value and
protecting the other stakeholders’ interests (Shah, Kouser, Aamir, & Hussain, 2012).
This definition is based on the collective interests of all the stakeholders, along with the
interest of the individual, and connects corporate governance practices to the strategic
decisions of the firms. Similarly, corporate governance is defined as the structure and
process through which a company’s affairs and operations are directed by enhancing
corporate accountability and business prosperity with the ultimate goal of improving
owners’ wealth (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). This group of definitions relates corporate
governance to business prosperity, and value of firms and shareholders.
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The variation between the above definitions of corporate governance clarifies the
different perspectives taken by the scholars. This variation is due to the wide variety of
subjects covered by corporate governance and by different authors who have different
viewpoints when examining companies, especially if they have different intellectual
backgrounds or interests. Thus, every scholar revises the definition of corporate
governance based on the investigated issue. However, these large numbers of corporate
governance definitions all share, implicitly or explicitly, some common factors. All of
the above definitions of corporate governance refer to the presence of a conflict of
interest between firms’ management and stakeholders, and insiders and outsiders arising
from the separation of ownership and management (Okpara & Kabongo, 2010).
Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and KSA
Corporate governance affects the developed countries, as well as developing
countries throughout the world. Corporate governance standards could be more
organized and sustainable in developed countries as compared to developing countries
where political, cultural, and economic backgrounds are sufficient (Mulili & Wong,
2011). This section explores the practices of corporate governance in developing
countries and KSA.
Corporate governance in developing countries. Corporate governance in
developing countries sounds like innovation, because of the lack of professional
management strategies, human resource capabilities, and investment confidence, as well
as weak legal and judiciary systems (Mulili & Wong, 2011). Most of the previous
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studies found that the corporate governance systems are variable and weak in developing
countries. Because of the severe financial crisis and influence of international financial
bodies, such as World Bank, most of the developing countries tried to establish corporate
governance standards and principles, such as KSA, Egypt, and South Africa. For
providing financial aid, World Bank and IMF have imposed structural development
programs to the developing nations, which require radical changes in corporate
governance practices (Aylin & Crowther, 2008). Investor protection and ownership
structures are a fundamental factor affecting corporate governance practices in developed
countries as well as developing countries. The concentrated ownership structure of
emergent markets is accepted due to the weak property right systems in these countries,
as most companies are owned and controlled by families (Aylin & Crowther, 2008).
In most developing countries, there are rules and regulations for conducting
business, legal and regulatory systems to protect the obligations and rights of investors,
and penalties for violators. However, the problem lies with the lack of monitoring and
enforcement of these systems, laws, rules, and regulations, as well as adopting improper
processes precluding effective implementation of corporate governance (Donaldson,
2012; Mande, Ishak, & Idris, 2014). Therefore, legal and regulatory systems should
include not only enacting rules and regulations, but also of setting up a mechanism for
enforcing those rules and regulations, as well as should have good standards of
supervision compliance to the rules and regulations. Thus, the legal framework in
developing countries for effective corporate governance exists, but the compliance and
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enforcement are nonexistent or weak (Okpara & Kabongo, 2010). The practices have
demonstrated that enforcement can be more important than the law on paper in
developing countries (Trivun & Mrgud, 2012).
In general, annual reports and websites of publicly listed companies in developing
countries are weak in terms of voluntary disclosure (Aylin & Crowther, 2008). Lack of
disclosure and transparency, and corruption among companies in developing countries
are greatest barriers to economic development, growth, and stability in these countries
(Aylin & Crowther, 2008). Finally, there exists a pressing need for a legislative overhaul
that creates regulatory agencies and contains their functions and enforcement mechanism
(Okpara & Kabongo, 2010).
Corporate governance in KSA. KSA has an open economy since its inception
as a modern state in 1932, but its financial sector delayed because the ruling regime
depends on Sharia Law that prohibits interest-based transactions. KSA mainly depends
on oil exporting revenue, which negatively affected the development of its securities
market. However, the recurring volatility in oil prices has raised the need of new sources
to diversify and thus reduce the effect of the fluctuation in the oil markets. Accordingly,
KSA has started on a progressive economic reform program that requires pressing need
for a modern financial market that complies to international standards of corporate
governance (Piesse, Strange, & Toonsi, 2012).
Corporate governance has attracted financial experts and researchers especially
with the advent of the twenty-first century as Saudi stock market grows and develops, as
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well as firms adopt contemporary corporate governance practices. KSA exerts ongoing
attempts for adopting international accounting and auditing standards thus enhancing the
acceptance and understanding of the inevitability of corporate governance (Al-Qarni,
2010). Accordingly, KSA has undergone radical reforms to its corporate governance
mechanism resulting in the issuance of Corporate Governance Regulations in 2006 to
augment and expedite the development of corporate governance. The key purpose of this
legislation is to protect the rights of all stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors,
employees, and lenders. The principles emphasized by this legislation are the
responsibility, accountability, transparency, and fairness. All publicly listed companies
on Tadawul should abide by this legislation and imposed disclosure in their annual
reports and other forms imposed by Saudi capital market (Al-Qarni, 2010).
Despite the extensive regulatory reforms undertaken to improve corporate
governance regulations, as well as strict supervision by Saudi Capital Market Authority
on the implementation, there are still firms listed on Tadawul that experience poor
compliance and weak performance. The leaders of publicly listed companies have
interpreted these regulations differently; the implementation of one rule varies from
company to another. To ensure high compliance by listed companies, regulatory
agencies in KSA should enforce unified implementation of corporate governance rules
and regulations through law.
Most Saudi firms have some specific characteristics, which affect the process of
adoption of corporate governance mechanisms. KSA, like many other Middle East
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countries, has high ownership concentration, along with dominance of family controlled
firms. Most companies are held by families, executives, directors, government, and
institutional or foreign ownership. Most ownership and management in Saudi firms are
aggregated, and the owners are usually unwilling to delegate their authority and
responsibility. Control is concentrated in the hands of dominant shareholders. Boards of
directors are dominated by majority shareholders to the extent that their effectiveness and
efficiency are doubtful. Other stakeholders appear to be marginalized in the actual
practices of companies and the legal framework (Piesse et al., 2012). The low levels of
disclosure and transparency, and the high levels of controls and concentrated ownership
differentiate the corporate governance in KSA from that in developed countries.
The agency problem in KSA is between the minority shareholders and dominant
shareholders. Agency problem is often created through an ownership structure of
complex pyramidal structures (Shah et al., 2012). Independent directors or non-executive
directors are mandated by law to protect the minority shareholders and improve firm
performance (Kumar & Singh, 2012). Hassan Al-Tamimi (2012) examined the
relationship between corporate governance and Saudi banks' performance and found a
positive relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and
financial performance, whereas found an insignificant relationship between the efficiency
of corporate governance mechanisms, and bank performance of government and local
ownership groups.
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms
In the aftermath of global financial crisis and financial scandals of a large number
of entities, corporate governance has become a significant issue in both developed and
developing countries. Much of the solutions built on the effective corporate governance
mechanisms in order to protect investor rights and their wealth (Kumar & Singh, 2012).
These mechanisms are designed to reduce the inefficiencies arising from adverse
selection and moral hazard (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).
There are two types of mechanisms: Internal audit mechanisms and external
monitoring mechanisms. All the companies’ activities are monitored and controlled
through internal mechanisms, while external mechanisms comprise the control exercised
over firms by external stakeholders (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). Corporate governance
utilizes internal monitoring mechanisms (Ngoungo, 2012). However, both types of
mechanisms could be used to align the interests of stakeholders and managers (Vintila &
Gherghina, 2012). In this heading, some of the corporate governance mechanisms that
represent the independent variables of this study are reviewed for understanding how they
reduce the inefficiencies that arise from opportunistic human behavior, as well as
understanding the relationship between each mechanism and both firm performance and
market value. The corporate governance mechanisms of this study are board size, board
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation.
Board size. The board of directors is the top executive unit of a firm and
responsible for laying down the strategies and policies, and monitoring the company
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activities (Maztoul, 2014; Pandya, 2011). The board is seen as a team of members with
fiduciary responsibilities of directing and leading company activities with the key
objective of protecting the interests of company’s shareholders and other stakeholders.
The board is assigned with three critical functions: Agency theory responsibilities,
resource dependence responsibilities, and legal responsibilities (Brédart, 2014; Pandya,
2011).
Under agency responsibilities, the board is responsible for protecting the
stakeholders’ interests by ensuring the decisions taken for the company benefit, rather
than the self-interests of executives, thereby the board becomes the guardian of the
owners’ interest. Under resource dependence responsibilities, the board is responsible for
acquiring resources for the company based on its relationship with other companies. The
legal responsibilities are a fiduciary responsibility; thereby the board fulfills a particular
requirement to represent the legal rights of all stakeholders. These responsibilities
include the hiring of the CEO and the evaluation of company performance (Stanwick &
Stanwick, 2010). In KSA, the board becomes an important tool complementing the weak
and inefficient corporate mechanisms to mitigate conflict of interests among the
interested parties of a firm.
Board size is an important mechanism that could alleviate an agency problem; it
is considered an important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness (Shin-Ping
& Hui-Ju, 2011). Board size affects the extent of supervision, controlling, monitoring,
and decision making in a firm. The scholars have not concurred on one optimal size for
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the board of directors. Some scholars concluded that there is an inverse relationship
between a company value and board size. The small board can help enhance firm
performance (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). From the agency perspective, small board is
more likely to allow members to engage in genuine interaction and debate (Reddy &
Locke, 2010). Also, these scholars argued that a large board may lead to a significant
and negative impact on the future investment return (Tai, 2015). When the board
members grow too big, boards become more symbolic, while a small board mitigates the
agency problem and become more effective in the management process (Vintila &
Gherghina, 2012). The incremental cost of poor communication may exceed the benefit
associated with a large board. The difficulties in communication and coordination may
increase when the board size increases. This causes more cost and greater agency
problem (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Sáenz González & García-meca, 2014).
Some scholars recommended that the board members should be limited to seven
or eight (Reddy & Locke, 2010). When the board of directors exceeds eight members,
the board is less likely to control effectively; this paves the way for the CEO to control.
Alternatively, fewer scholars concluded that a larger board may provide greater
management supervision, increased pool of experience, and access to a wider range of
resources (Brédart, 2014; Reddy & Locke, 2010). Consistent with this perspective, the
dependence theory assumes that larger board size may result in higher profitability and
market value because of the different expertizes knowledge and skills of board members
(Ghazali, 2010; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014). However, the effect of board size on
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performance and market value may differ for different types of organizations (Habbash &
Bajaher, 2014; Nicolaescu, 2012). In KSA, Corporate Governance Regulations limit the
minimum number of directors to be at least three and maximum eleven (Habbash &
Bajaher, 2014).
Board independence. Most the efforts exerted by countries regulators have
focused on the issue of board independence for reducing the CEO’s influence over the
board of directors (Joseph, Ocasio, & Mcdonnell, 2014). These regulators have required
a minimum fraction of the board members to be independent. The rationale of these
regulations is that if directors are independent of the executives, they are more likely to
protect and defend shareholders and other stakeholders interests (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012).
The independence of the board is a crucial mechanism, because outside directors
represent true controls and can discipline the management to achieve firm objectives
(Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).
From the agency theory perspective, external or independent directors are more
valuable than the insider directors, because they are less committed to the firm’s
management and its goals (Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova, 2011; Misangyi & Acharya,
2014). In addition, the insiders may be beholden to the CEO for their jobs; thereby they
would not be keen to raise the sensitive issues of CEO actions and performance. Outside
directors or independent directors are those board members who do not hold a large
percentage of a company’s shares, or they do not have professional relationships with the
company they monitor (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). The outside directors bear the
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same legal responsibilities as the inside directors, but they accomplish the effectiveness
by influencing company decisions, rather than monitoring and controlling operations.
However, outside directors face difficulties in performing their responsibilities as they are
not directly associated with the management (Pandya, 2011).
The independence protects shareholder interest, and conducts control and
monitors functions in a better way to align managers’ interests and stakeholders’
interests. Therefore, to reduce the agency cost, the board is required to include a majority
of independent directors, because they make the strategic planning role and monitoring
role of the board more effective (Bouchareb, Ajina, & Souid, 2014; Kumar & Singh,
2012). The independent directors are more efficient and specialized to control the board
than the executives and inside directors, as they have the capability to mitigate the
concentrated power of the CEO, resulting in preventing the misuse of firm resources and
improving its performance and market value. However, sometimes independent directors
are more likely to align their interests with the management, rather than the shareholders,
because they hold an unimportant stake in the firm (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). From a
different perspective, the proponents of stewardship theory argue that inside directors
possess all necessary and vital information to take better managerial decisions, so they
claim that a superior performance is associated with a majority of insiders (Syriopoulos
& Tsatsaronis, 2012).
The findings of some research on the relationship between board independency
and firm performance are mixed (Darus & Mohamed, 2011; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014;
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Ghazali, 2010; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). Several authors
found that the independent directors improve company performance and protect
stakeholders in some cases in which there exists an agency problem, whereas others
found either negative impact or no significant impact of independent directors on
company performance (Kumar & Singh, 2012). There are several reasons for these
contrasting findings, such as differences in samples, performance measures, time frames,
and sometimes the operational definition of independent directors (Dimitropoulos &
Tsagkanos, 2012). Accordingly, the selection of independent directors does not
guarantee an improvement in the firm performance. The success of a firm mostly
depends on the balanced composition of a board combination of outside and inside
directors (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012). The findings of most research found that the optimal
level of independent directorship is between 25% and 50% of the total board size
(Pandya, 2011). Considering as an important attribute of an efficient board, KSA’s
Corporate Governance Regulations made it compulsory in 2006 that at least two or onethird of the members whichever is greater should be independent directors in order to
improve core competencies of companies (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014).
Board committees. One of internal corporate governance mechanisms is board
committees, which ensures that managers behave in the best interest of the stakeholders,
including shareholders (Reddy & Locke, 2010). Suitable number of board committees is
created according to the firm circumstances and requirements to help the board of
directors to do its duties and responsibilities in an efficient and effective manner. These
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committees are formed in accordance with the policies, rules and procedures laid down
by the board, showing the responsibilities, duties, powers, and duration of each
committee, as well as the manner in which the board controls and monitors its duties and
responsibilities. Each committee should comprise sufficient numbers of the independent
and non-executive members that are concerned with activities and actions that might
contain a conflict of interest, such as determination of remuneration, appointment of
CEO, and integrity of financial and non-financial reports (KSA’s Corporate Governance
Regulations, 2006). The three common committees in Saudi publicly held companies are
audit committee, nomination and remuneration committee, and executive committee.
Audit committees. According to KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations
(2006), the board of directors should form an audit committee and its member should not
be less than three, among them a specialist in accounting and financial matters. The
committee members should be independent or non-executive directors. The shareholders
general assembly should issue the rules for the formation and appointing the audit
committee members and identify the duration and procedure to be followed by the
committee. The key duty of the audit committee is to review the internal accounting
system and control process, as well as hold meetings with the external auditors regularly
to review financial statements (Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorty, & Wright, 2014;
Maztoul, 2014; Samaha & Abdallah, 2012).
Consistent with the agency theory, an independent audit committee acts as an
additional monitoring mechanism that makes sure that the interests of shareholders are
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protected (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012). Accordingly, the audit committee mechanism
improves the monitoring of management and communication between external auditors
and the board (Samaha & Abdallah, 2012). Audit committee plays an important role in
enhancing company performance and value by implementing the principles of corporate
governance, though Nuryanah and Islam (2011) revealed a negative relationship of an
independent audit committee when the members have accounting and finance
qualification, and performance. This is inconsistent with the recommendation of the best
practice for sound corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2014; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).
The independence principles require that the audit committee should work
independently and discharge its duties and responsibilities with professional care (Gill &
Obradovich, 2012). Audit committee independence allows its members to challenge the
executives’ decisions because of a lack of a personal relationship with firm’s managers
(Darus & Mohamed, 2011). The audit committee helps alleviate agency problems
through monitoring mechanisms that improve the flows of information quality between
firm shareholders and managers (Gill & Obradovich, 2012). However, the previous
studies revealed mixed findings with respect to the relationship between the audit
committee and its member independence, and financial information reliability and
internal control. Some researchers found a positive relationship between the reliable
financial information and independent audit committees; whereas some researchers
concluded that the independent audit committee did not improve the reliability of
financial information (Maztoul, 2014; Rambo, 2013; Rouf, 2011). Others found a
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positive association between sound internal control and the presence of audit committee
independence. The financial specialist of audit committee increases the likelihood that
material misstatements will be detected and corrected in a timely fashion and discloses
more information compared to firms without independent audit committee (Darus &
Mohamed, 2011; Gill & Obradovich, 2012).
Nomination and remuneration committees. According to KSA’s Corporate
Governance Regulations (2006), the board of each publicly listed company shall set up a
committee of nomination and remuneration. The shareholders general assembly shall
issue rules for appointment of the committee members, their remuneration, and
committee duration, as well as the procedures to be followed by the members. The main
responsibility and duty of nomination and remuneration committee is recommending to
the board the appointment of board members. Also, the committee reviews the structure
of the board and recommends the proper changes, reviews the skills of board members,
spells out the strength and weakness points of the members, lays down clear policies
regarding the remuneration and indemnity of top executives and board members, and
finally ensures the independence of the board members and the absence of any conflict of
interests related to the members (KSAs Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).
Reddy and Locke (2010) found a positive association between the existence of a
nomination and remuneration committee and both firm performance and value, but they
noted this relationship is not considerably significant.
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Executive committees. The board of directors may create a committee to be
named executive committee (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006). This
committee may meet to make decisions about issues that arise between scheduled board
meetings, as these issues should not be postponed until the next scheduled meeting of the
board. The main responsibilities and duties of the executive committee are to provide
organizational direction on behalf of the entire board and make decisions ranging from
policy, strategy planning, investment and risk, and then report upward its actions to the
entire board. Furthermore, executive committee may be responsible for other duties,
such as evaluating company executive directors. However, this committee does not have
authority regarding certain actions, such as dividend distributions, merger or sale of
corporate assets, appointing or removing directors and officers, amending article of
association, or determining committee members’ compensation.
Ownership structures. Ownership structure is one of the most important factors
in corporate governance mechanisms, which shapes governance system of any country,
as this factor identifies the nature of the agency problem. Ownership structure is
important in laying down the discipline of managers, company’s objectives, and
shareholder wealth. Corporate governance rules both shareholders and managers to have
unified goals and objectives of maximizing company performance and value (Ibrahim &
Samad, 2011; Liao, Shyu, & Chien, 2014). There exist two important aspects of firm
ownership structure as composition and concentration. Ownership composition
determines who the shareholders are and who belongs to the controlling groups
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(Mangunyi, 2011; Sáenz González & García-meca, 2014). According to agency theory,
the better overlap between shares ownership and business control result in mitigation in
conflicts of interests, thereby increasing organization value (Mangunyi, 2011).
The degree of ownership concentration in a company identifies how power and
authority are distributed between the managers and shareholders. Concentrated
ownership considers the proportion of the company shares owned by the greatest
shareholders, which may tend to exert pressures on managers to adopt a corporate
behavior maximizing their wealth (Ojo, 2014; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012). However,
there are competing arguments between alignment theory and expropriation theory on
whether ownership concentration is beneficial or detrimental to the company outside
shareholders (Leung & Horwitz, 2010).
As per the alignment theory, when the ownership is concentrated in the hand of
some shareholders, shareholding control tends to be sound and agency cost would be less.
Accordingly, ownership concentration plays a significant role in controlling and
monitoring a firm’s management, as a result, the interests of both shareholders and
management are aligned. Therefore, the ownership disperses leads to poor shareholder
monitoring. The shareholders with small stakes are less likely to be active and interested
in monitoring activities because they would bear high monitoring costs and get less
benefits (Mangunyi, 2011). As per the exploitation theory, there is a problem with the
ownership concentration, as controlling shareholders who may act in their own interests
would exploit minority shareholders. The ownership concentration enables the
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shareholders who have a significant stake in a company to appoint and fire managers that
will hinder them from external control mechanisms. Therefore, ownership concentration
intensifies the conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders (Leung &
Horwitz, 2010; Soltani, 2014). The previous studies produced mixed results with respect
to the relationship between the ownership concentration and firm performance (Leung &
Horwitz, 2010).
The check and balance of ownership is very important governance mechanism in
solving the ownership concentration debate and improving firm performance (Mangunyi,
2011). The check and balance of ownership exists when many large shareholders share
the control and monitor for a firm. Accordingly, no one major shareholder of the firm
can solely monitor the business and the process of decision making, rather, the decision
making is done through the coordination and negotiation among several large
shareholders, leading to good performance (Mangunyi, 2011).
There are three different kinds of ownership in KSA as managerial ownership,
foreign ownership, and government ownership. Agency theory assumes that the
managerial ownership can help mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and
managers, because the manager who owns the significant portion of the firm shares has
more motivation and incentives to make better decisions to maximize firm value.
Contrary to agency theory, managerial ownership may make value-reducing decisions to
protect their interests in the company regardless the interests of outside shareholders, and
hence communication and coordination problems would increase, resulting in reducing

58
the company value (Garcia-Meca & Juan Pedro, 2011). However, the empirical research
with respect to the relationship between managerial ownership and both firm
performance and market value are mixed (Ghazali, 2010). If the ownership structure of a
firm contains a large proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders, indication are that
foreign shareholders have confidence in the performance of that firm, leading to positive
effect on market value.
Previous studies found that firms with a higher portion of foreign shareholders
disclosed significantly more operating and financial information in their annual report in
order to attract more investors (Ghazali, 2010). Government ownership is another
common feature of the business environment in KSA. The government ownership in
publicly listed companies in KSA ensures close control and monitoring of the activities
of these companies. The government monitoring would lead to ongoing success of these
companies, so that the stability of stock market and economy is met. Thus, it may be
expected that these companies may perform better than others. However, the results of
previous studies on the relationship between government ownership and both firm
performance and market value are mixed as are kinds of ownership structure (Ghazali,
2010).
In KSA, the ownership was found concentrated, particularly in family companies.
Moreover, boards of directors are more dominated by the majority of shareholders to the
extent that their effectiveness in monitoring decision making process is doubtful. In
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KSA, Stakeholders, other than shareholders, sound to be marginalized in the actual
practice of firms (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Piesse et al., 2012).
Executive compensation. Executives with no or little ownership stake in the
companies they run have little incentive and motivation to manage the company in a
manner consistent with the owners interests. This conflict is essentially contractual in
nature that can be solved through executive compensation combined with board of
directors and capital market oversight (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Sur, 2011). Executive
compensation is a tool designed to strengthen the ability of board and shareholders to
control management actions (Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova, & Sirmans, 2011). Executive
compensation can include basic salaries and variable compensations, such as share
options, dividends, and bonuses, as well as fringe benefits (Lin, 2010). Consistent with
agency theory, executive compensation is an important factor of internal corporate
governance mechanisms, which can reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and
executives (Mangunyi, 2011; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).
Shareholders can use compensation schemes for rewarding the managers
financially to align company interests with shareholder interests. The schemes include
plans where executives get shares, mostly at a discount price. Furthermore, these
schemes may link levels of benefits and executive compensation to firm value and
shareholders returns; part of this compensation is deferred to the future to reward longterm value maximization. A significant portion of executive compensation must be
“locked” in for a period ranges from 5 to 10 years and based upon the achievement of
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long-term success of the firm (Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, & Ryan, 2014). Such schemes
hinder short-term managers’ actions, which can be detrimental to firm value (Syriopoulos
& Tsatsaronis, 2012). Thus, firms can resolve agency problems and maximize their
values via compensation systems (Lin, 2010).
Some previous empirical studies found that increasing executive compensation
can directly improve firm performance based on supervision mechanisms (Lin, 2010).
Furthermore, they found a positive association between executive compensation and firm
share prices. However, others found no association between executive compensation and
corporate performance (Lin, 2010).
Corporate Governance Indexes
There are no generally accepted corporate governance mechanisms by the
different countries. Furthermore, management scholars use different corporate
governance definitions, instrumentations, and indices depending on the researcher’s
interest and purpose (Bonna, 2011; Mulili & Wong, 2011). Therefore, several indexes
have been used to measure corporate governance mechanisms.
Gompers et al. (2003) created a G-Index as a measure of corporate governance
and the strength of shareholder rights using corporate takeover defenses, bylaw
provisions, and firm rules. The G-Index varies from 0 to 24 (Alimehmeti & Paletta,
2014). Each parameter of shareholder rights is given a zero/one score. Zero shows no
particular limitation on shareholder rights, whereas a one indicates the existence of a
limiting provision. A lower number shows greater management entrenchment, less
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transparency, and existence of more provisions limiting shareholder rights. A higher
number shows a greater emphasis on shareholder rights, a relative absence of
management entrenchment provisions, and greater transparency of information and
processes (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014). Thus, a higher G-Index is combined with robust
shareholder rights and higher financial performance; whereas a lower G-Index is
combined with weak shareholder rights, lower financial performance, and lower market
value. This index does not accurately reflect the relative impacts of the various
provisions. In addition, it does not require any judgments about the effectiveness or
wealth effects of any of these provisions; it only considers the impact on the balance of
power.
Brown and Caylor (2004) also constructed governance composite indexes using
publicly available data compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This
governance index composite score was identified as G-Index (GI). The results showed
that higher indexes show higher firm value (Tobin's Q ) and higher market return, and
better financial and operating performance (ROA and ROE). Brown and Caylor
calculated the index from 52 of the variables, which firm characteristics and governance
provisions including executive compensation and executive mandatory retirement age.
The feasible range of scores is 0 to 52 with each variable equally weighted by "1". A
higher index score is associated with more robust corporate governance effectiveness,
with a G-Index of 51 being the highest.
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Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) developed an E-Index based on IRRC
publicly available data. Bebchuk et al. used a 6-provision subset of the G-Index. The
index ranges from 0 to 6. A lowest score of 0 is related to high shareholder rights,
whereas a highest score of 6 is related to weak shareholder rights. Consistent with Gindex, E-index gives an equal weight to each of set provisions by assigning one point to
each of the provision a firm has.
In addition, the Corporate Library, a leading independent source for corporate
governance data constructed a governance index. The benchmark score of this index is
based on board composition, board classification, board tenure, board size, boards
interlock, open adoption of corporate governance policies, CEO compensation structure,
and the age of directors’ retirement. The index ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 100.
The index is developed by overweighting the data believed to most likely impact
governance practices (Bonna, 2011).
Corporate Governance Effect on Financial Performance and Market Value
Theoretically, good corporate governance can achieve better financial
performance and value in both developed and emergent markets. Financial performance
and market value have several dimensions, including asset quality, capital adequacy,
returns on capital, and share price among other parameters (Rambo, 2012). Also,
financial performance and market value are impacted by several factors other than
corporate governance. These factors are sales growth, technology, environment, legal
and social environment, macroeconomic, liquidity, firm size, leverage, management
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competence, qualified employees in the top managerial staff, and so on (Bonna, 2011).
In this section, the findings of the previous research with respect to the relationship
between corporate governance and both corporate performance and market value are
explored.
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The
literature of corporate governance in developing and developed countries provided
controversial findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance, and the
company economic and financial performance (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). Various
researchers have linked corporate governance to performance of corporate entities, but
the results are not convergent (Abels & Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011;
Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin,
Hevrani, & Iranmahd, 2012; Nicolaescu ,2012; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011; PelayoMaciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014; Ur Rehman & Mangla, 2012;
Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).
Most researchers revealed that the corporate governance is an important
ingredient for the overall growth of the firm performance, as well as the country’s
economy (e.g., Abels & Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya &
Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012; Nicolaescu
,2012; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011; Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu,
2014). The results drawn by different researchers are positive and direct, as corporate
governance plays an important role in enhancing the performance of the firm (Abels &
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Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama,
2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012; Nicolaescu ,2012; Nuryanah &
Islam, 2011; Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014). However,
some researchers also had drawn negative and indirect results, as well as neutral and
mixed relationships (Ahmed & Gabor, 2011; Bagchi, 2011; Hassan Al-Tamimi, 2012;
Ibrahim et al., 2010; Mangunyi, 2011; Pandya, 2011; Peni & Vahamaa, 2012; Vintila and

Gherghina, 2012). For the purpose of this study, I reviewed 39 empirical researches; 25
studies showed a positive relationship, one showed a negative relationship, four showed a
neutral relationship, and nine revealed a mixed relationship between corporate
governance and financial performance.
Positive relationships. The majority of researchers have supported the positive
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance (Abels & Martelli,
2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012;
Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012; Nicolaescu ,2012; Nuryanah & Islam,
2011; Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014). Martani and Saputra
(2009) used the mean equality test and multiple regression to examine the effect of
corporate governance to the performance of the firm measured by Economic Value
Added (EVA). Martani and Saputra found that the corporate governance has a significant
impact on EVA. However, the corporate governance index is superior in affecting ROE
more than ROA and EVA.
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Leung and Horwitz (2010) used a regression model to examine the effects of
management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’
stock performance following the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). The results showed
that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, along with the duality
of CEO/chairman position experienced a smaller stock price decline. By testing
companies' responses to the nine high level principles and guidelines promulgated by
New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC), Reddy and Locke (2010) addressed the
relationship between corporate governance practices, which based on the principles, and
the financial performance of large publicly traded firms. Panel data for the top 50
companies listed on New Zealand capital market over the period 1999-2007 were used
and analyzed using two stage least squares (2SLS) regression techniques and ordinary
least squares (OLS). The findings revealed a positive relationship between the NZSC
recommendations and firm performance, as well as remuneration committee and firm
performance (Reddy & Locke, 2010). This study provided a comprehensive picture of
performance outcomes that have not been achieved in previous studies.
Using the classic model approach, Ivashkovskaya and Stepanova (2011)
examined the impact of ownership structure, board of directors’ activity, and capital
structure on corporate performance. The results of the study found that the board's
composition and the investors with significant voting power affect firm performance
positively. In addition, the results found the impact of government ownership varies

66
depending on the country, while the independent directors and related shareholders seem
add more value to corporations.
Nuryanah and Islam (2011) examined the impact of the corporate governance
mechanisms and corporate financial performance in Indonesia. Nuryanah and Islam
assumed that the results on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the
corporate performance, which is relevant to developed stock markets, were not
appropriate for emerging stock markets, because the cultural and political environments
are different between the two markets. The findings of the study revealed that all internal
corporate governance mechanisms except size of both audit committee and board, and
management ownership have a significant relationship with firm performance (Nuryanah
& Islam, 2011).
Abels and Martelli (2011) investigated the compliance status within the largest
500 firms in the United States to uncover the status of the extent in which CEO duality
exists within the US. The results revealed little evidence to support that a two-tier system
improves sales revenue, profits, or shareholder returns. Despite the large sample, the
findings cannot be generalized on the medium and small revenue-producing firms,
because the sample was selected among the top revenue-producing firms. Also, Chahine
and Safieddine (2011) investigated the relationship between board size and its
composition, and bank performance in Lebanon using a fixed-effect model. Chahine
and Safieddine used 749 firm years of data from 1992 to 2006. The results found that the
bank performance is positively related to board size and board independence.
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Using a sample of 54 firms listed companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange
(NSE), Ongore and Kobonyo (2011) examined the interrelations among ownership, board
and manager characteristics, and firm performance. PPMC, logistic regression, and
stepwise regression were used to achieve the purpose of the study. The findings found a
significant positive relationship between corporate performance, and institutional, insider,
foreign and diverse ownership forms, as well as managerial discretion, whereas the
relationship between corporate performance, and government and ownership
concentration was significantly negative (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011). In the same year
and based on empirical analyses of 11 large Tunisian commercial banks during 19972006, Rachdi and Ines (2011) analyzed board characteristics and its effect on
performance and incentives to take the risk in the banking industry. The results found
that bank board structure is a determinant factor for bank risk taking and bank
performance, which supported the idea, commonly accepted.
Lama (2012) used the Pearson correlation to test the association between firms’
corporate governance structure and a firm’s operating outcomes. Mid-sized Australian
ASX firms were used to proxy the sample companies’ corporate governance quality.
Lama found significant positive relationships between a firm's operating performance and
the mid-size companies who did not implement corporate governance well adversely
affected their shareholder returns.
Using a sample of 84 publicly listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange from
year 2007 to 2011, Moradi et al. (2012) investigated the effects of financing activities and

68
corporate governance mechanisms on firms' performance. The authors concluded that
financing decisions, capital structures, and corporate governance are affected by
companies’ performance (Moradi et al., 2012). Capital structures and corporate
governance can increase profitability and shareholder's value in the long term.
Nicolaescu (2012) analyzed and discussed the impact of corporate governance
mechanisms on company performance in China during the crisis. Nicolaescu concluded
that the corporate governance mechanisms, corporate board, and ownership structure
affect company performance. Using a sample of 43 publicly listed companies on
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2009, Nuryaman (2012) examined the impact of
corporate governance practices on the firm’s financial performance. Nuryaman used
multiple linear regression and concluded that corporate governance has a positive effect
on both stock performance and firm's operational performance.
Furthermore, Shah et al. (2012) examined the relationship among the corporate
governance, firm’s performance, ownership structure, and the firm’s risk taking behavior.
Using regression models, the authors found that the improvement in the corporate
governance practices has a positive effect on both the company's financial performance
and the decreases in the risk level, whereas, corporate governance has a negative
relationship with the concentration of ownership (Shah et al., 2012). Using data of 43
shipping firms listed on two major US stock exchanges, NASDAQ and NYSE,
Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) investigated the relationship between CEO duality
and corporate financial performance of shipping firms. The results of the study found a
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positive relationship between CEO separation and corporate financial performance of
shipping firms; these findings support agency theory.
Moreover, Koncevičienė et al. (2012) examined the relationship between the
introduction of new EU directives regulating corporate governance issues and the capital
markets performance of EU countries. The authors selected three EU countries as
representative of developed markets and emerging market; Germany and United
Kingdom represented the developed markets, while Lithuania represented the emerging
markets. Koncevičienė et al. (2012) found that developed capital markets, represented by
Deutsche Börse and London SE demonstrated the increasing change tendencies of their
indexes and other performance indicators of these capital markets till the end of 2007
when the world financial crisis happened. In addition, the results showed that developed
markets represented by Germany and United Kingdom demonstrated better performance
after the transposition of the directive (Koncevičienė et al., 2012). However, these
findings cannot be generalized, because of the limited number of EU countries.
Pelayo-Maciel et al. (2012) discussed the effect of the structure of corporate
governance on financial performance and human resource management in Colombia.
The authors analyzed the concept and structure of corporate governance, and discussed
both the stewardship theory and agency theory. Pelayo-Maciel et al. (2012) found that
the structure of corporate governance can positively affect the functioning of the firm
itself and improve its financial performance. Also, Chou and Hardin (2012) investigated
whether firms with strong governance generate higher returns, as well as examined the
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association between mutual fund corporate governance preference and fund performance
segmented by fund investment style. The sample period was from 1990 to 2008 and data
obtained from three sources: The corporate G-index was from the IRRC, stock returns
were from the CRSP stock file, and mutual fund returns and fund characteristics were
from the CRSP Survivor Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database. A direct relationship
was found between overall mutual fund corporate governance preference and the
corporate governance premium. There is evidence that the investment preferences of
mutual funds forecast the change in the corporate governance premium and investment
activities of institutional investors can affect stock performance (Chou & Hardin, 2012).
Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos (2012) examined the impact of corporate
governance quality on the profitability and viability of European Union's football clubs
over the period 2005-2009. Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos found that the corporate
governance quality leads to greater levels of profitability and viability. However, the
results of this study cannot be generalized, because the data set covered a single sport
activity (football) and was restricted within a specific region (EU).
Ergin (2012) investigated whether or not investors considered the ranking of
corporate governance when evaluating the share price, as well as the entire effect of
corporate governance on the share price. A price model was used to examine all the rated
firms quoted to ISE for the years 2006 to 2010. The financial performance and
accounting performance were found significantly and positively associated with the
corporate governance rankings. The components of corporate governance that have a
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positive and significant association with the financial performance are stakeholders,
public disclosure, and transparency.
Reyna (2012) studied the relationship between ownership structure and
performance of 90 companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange for the period 20052009, excluding companies that do not include enough information in their financial
statements, non-profit companies, and financial institutions. Reyna (2012) founds that
the ownership concentration significantly affects the company performance. The
corporations with high levels of ownership concentration seek a better way to protect and
maximize their interests, but this high concentration, especially in family companies,
leads to the use of additional corporate governance mechanisms. Tin-yan and Shu-kam
(2012) examined the relationship between board committees and firm performance and
the moderating effect of family ownership for public companies in Hong Kong. The
sample comprised of 346 firm-year observations for the periods 2001-2003. The authors
found a significant relationship between a nomination and remuneration committee and
company performance, depending on the independence of its composition (Tin-yan &
Shu-kam, 2012).
Rambo (2013) used one-way ANOVA, multiple regression models, and Pearson's
correlation coefficients to examine the relationship between corporate governance factors
and the financial performance of Kenyan commercial banks. Rambo found a positive
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance, but unlisted and listed
commercial banks were significantly different in terms of financial performance and
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other factors. Doğan, Elitaş, Ağca, and Ögel (2013) examined the impact of CEO duality
on the firm performance using a sample of 204 traded companies on Istanbul Stock
Exchange from the years 2009-2010. The authors found a negative relationship between
CEO duality and company performance, which is consistent with the agency theory
(Doğan et al., 2013). The shareholders would get a better return in companies that have
separate CEO and chairperson positions in terms of share of profit and price.
Ştefănescu (2014) analyzed the relationship between corporate governance and
both corporate performance and strategies of banking institutions at European Union
level. The findings of the analysis revealed that corporate governance has positive effect
on bank performance measured by ROA and ROE. However, these findings cannot be
generalized, because of the limited number of independent factors, restricting the sample
to the banks, and the use of a one year of data for analysis.
Negative relationships. Using the cross-sectional multiple linear regression
models, Vintila and Gherghina (2012) examined the relationship between corporate
governance ratings and firm performance. The models included both a global measure of
corporate governance and four sub-indices as corresponding audit, board structure, and
shareholder rights and compensation, provided by Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS). Vintila and Gherghina found a negative relationship between firm performance
and corporate governance global rating. The findings also showed a negative relationship
between firm performance and corporate governance sub-indices, with some exception.
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However, when the authors excluded the firms belonging to real estate and financial
sector, the results supported the same findings.
Neutral relationships. Several other studies have found neutral relationships
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance. Ghazali (2010)
evaluated the impact of the implementation of the new regulations of Malaysian
government on corporate performance. Ghazali used data of 87 non-financial listed
companies included in the composite index; the data were extracted from the year 2001
annual reports. Ghazali found no one of the corporate governance variables was
statistically significant in explaining corporate performance. However, the government
as a substantial shareholder and foreign ownership were statistically significantly
associated with corporate performance. The results of this study were limited and cannot
be generalized, because the regulations on corporate governance were implemented in
2001, so it was early to reach a proper conclusion for the financial year 2001 as
regulatory changes may take several years before they show positive or intended results.
Bagchi (2011) examined whether corporate governance affects market returns.
Bagchi used descriptive statistics, vector auto-regression, and ordinary regression; as well
as conducted a test of significance for means and variances of the series. The effect of
economic shocks on the capital market performance of the higher governance index firms
was found similar to moderate and low governance indexed firms (Bagchi, 2011). These
results disagreed with the results of some previous research, which found that a portfolio
containing sound corporate governance companies had gained more investment return as
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compared to the return of a portfolio containing weak corporate governance firms
(Bagchi, 2011).
Using a sample of twelve banks out of which there are eight public sector banks
and four private sector banks, Pandya (2011) examined the effect of corporate
governance structures on the corporate performance. Data were obtained from the annual
reports of the selected Indian banks from the websites of the banks for two different
periods: Year 2005-06 and 2008-9. Pandya founded no significant impact of the
corporate governance structures on the banks’ financial performance. However, the
results obtained are restricted and cannot be generalized because of sample size is small.
Finally, Coskun and Sayilir (2012) examined the relationship between corporate
governance, and both company value and profitability performance of Turkish
companies. The authors found no significant relationship between corporate governance
and financial performance. However, the study findings are limited because of using
only observation of 31 companies of different periods, 2006-2010 (Coskun & Sayilir,
2012).
Mixed relationships. By taking a sample from Canadian Businesses ' rankings of
the top 25 worst board of directors and the top 25 board of directors for 2007, Stanwick
and Stanwick (2010) examined whether a good corporate governance yields higher
financial performance than poor corporate governance for Canadian firms. Stanwick and
Stanwick found that the effects of firm board on firm performance are mixed and
discovered a positive association between the board of directors with a high
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accountability level and firm performance, while found a significant negative relationship
between board independence and financial performance. In general, the authors revealed
that the overall corporate governance helps improve the financial position of the
companies (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2010). However, the results of this study were limited
and cannot be generalized, because the sample was small.
Using a sample of 40 bank managers within Nairobi City in Kenya, Mangunyi
(2011) examined the impact of corporate governance, in particular ownership structure,
on Kenyan’s bank performance. Mangunyi used a semi-structured questionnaire which
consisted of both closed and open-ended questions. The author found a significant
difference between corporate governance and financial performance of banks, whereas no
significant difference between the ownership type and bank performance, and between
corporate governance practices and banks ownership structure (Mangunyi, 2011).
Ahmed and Gabor (2011) examined the impact of corporate governance
mechanisms on corporate financial performance of 27 listed banking companies in
Bangladesh for the period of 2003-2008. Ahmed & Gabor found no significant effect of
corporate governance mechanisms on financial performances, while found an
insignificant negative effect of independent directors and non-independent non-executive
directors on the level of bank performance. Ahmed and Gabor recommended that
companies should balance between corporate governance mechanisms and their
performance by adopting risk management and strategic decision, along with efficient
utilization of company’s resources.
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Vintila and Gherghina (2012) examined the effect of CEO characteristics and
corporate governance mechanisms on U.S. listed firms' performance using a random
sample of 155 U.S companies for year 2011. Vintila and Gherghina used the crosssection multiple linear regression and found mixed results between corporate governance
and firm performance. Vintila and Gherghina found a positive relationship between
insider shareholdings and price-earnings ratio and, and also found no significant
relationship between firm performance and the number of independent directors from the
board, and there were mixed findings with respect to the relationship between corporate
performance and board size.
Abels and Martelli (2012) examined the independence of CEO and Chairmen,
which can impact both the perceived independence of management and company
performance to compliment the literature. Abels and Martelli selected the top 500
companies in the U.S. in terms of sales revenue. Abels and Martelli found that CEO
duality was neither important nor significant to corporate performance. Abels and
Martelli also found that CEO age was important and significant to corporate
performance. Hassan Al-Tamimi (2012) investigated the impact of corporate governance
on UAE national banks’ performance and financial distress. The study population
included the heavy banks involved in corporate governance of the UAE national banks.
Hassan Al-Tamimi found a significant positive relationship between financial distress
and corporate governance practices of UAE national banks and no significant relationship
between corporate governance and performance level.
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Furthermore, Peni and Vahamaa (2012) examined whether or not the sound
corporate governance mechanisms of the banks were associated with better stock market
performance and higher profitability amidst the crisis of 2008. The selected sample
consisted of 62 large publicly traded U.S. banks and 248 firm-year observations for the
years 2005–200 8 (Peni &Vahamaa, 2012). Peni and Vahamaa found that the effects of
corporate governance on bank performance are mixed. Strong governance may have
negative effects on stock market values of banks amidst the crisis; despite the findings
revealed a strong relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and the
high profitability in 2008 of the banks. However, Peni and Vahamaa contended that
strong corporate governance may have alleviated the adverse impact of the financial
crisis on bank credibility.
Ur Rehman and Mangla (2012) investigated the relationship between corporate
governance variables and the firm performance of thirty banks in Pakistan for the
period of 2001-2009. Ur Rehman and Mangla found a significant effect of corporate
governance variables, especially board size, on the performance of the overall banking
sector in Pakistan, whereas no significant effect of corporate governance practices on
the foreign banks performance. Further studies are recommended to generalize these
results by increasing the sample period and replacing or increasing the different corporate
governance variables of the study.
Using a sample of nine banks in Nigeria for years 2006 to 2010, Onakoya et al.
(2014) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and financial
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performance using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. The authors found
that the ownership structure and board size positively affect ROE, whereas corporate
governance indicator has negative effect on the assets of the banks. However, the authors
found that the relationship between board composition and banks profitability was
insignificant. Furthermore, the authors showed that both economic conditions factors and
regulatory influence have insignificant effect on ROA and ROE (Onakoya et al., 2014).
Onakoya et al. (2014) recommended that government agencies and regulators should
ensure stability in the country macroeconomic environment.
The relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Similar to
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, most corporate
governance scholars found that the corporate governance is an important factor for the
firm value. Most of the researchers found a significant and positive relationship between
corporate governance and firm value, as corporate governance plays an important role in
enhancing the value of the firm. Among eight empirical research articles reviewed, six
researchers found a positive relationship (Berthelot et al., 2010; Gill & Obradovich,
2012; Kumar & Singh, 2012; Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 2011; Yang, 2011; Zerni, Kallunki, &
Nilsson, 2010), while two researchers found a mixed relationship between corporate
governance and market value (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Garcia-Meca & Juan Pedro,
2011).
Positive relationships. Berthelot et al. (2010) examined whether the corporate
governance rankings published by market information intermediary were reflected in the
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values that investors accorded to firms. The study sample composed of 289 firms
covered by the Globe and Mail corporate governance ratings for years 2002 to 2005. The
authors used a price model relating share price to book value of equity (BVEjt) and
current net income (NIjt). The author found a significant relationship between the
corporate governance rankings and firm market value and accounting results (Berthelot et
al., 2010). However, the results of this study are limited cannot be generalized, because
the potential interrelations between contextual variables and corporate governance
practices were not taken into account.
Zerni et al. (2010) investigated the effectiveness of two main corporate
governance mechanisms, the auditing and board of directors, in alleviating the equity
discounts that arise from the potential entrenchment problem between inside shareholders
(managers) and outside shareholders. The sample of this study consisted of 1,171 firmyear observations for years 2000-2006; these firms listed on the SSE (Zerni et al., 2010).
The authors found both higher quality auditors and boards with equity incentives may act
as effective governance mechanisms with positive valuation implications (Zerni et al.,
2010).
By taking data from publicly traded firms in Taiwan, covering a ten-year period
from1995-2004, Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju (2011) examined the relationships among CEO
compensation, ownership, and firm value. Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju found that CEO
compensation, CEO ownership, and firm value are related. Furthermore, institution
ownership, firm value, firm size, board size, and CEO ownership are positively
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interdependent with CEO compensation. Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju contended that the proper
compensation package of executives could decrease agency costs between managers and
shareholders. As the previous studies provided inconclusive results on the relationship
between corporate governance structure and firm value, Yang (2011) examined the
impact of corporate governance on firm value in Canada. The author found that the
connection between firm value and corporate governance is sensitive to the methodology
employed. The author also found that adopting high-standard corporate governance may
increase firm value (Yang, 2011).
Kumar and Singh (2012) investigated if the monitoring by independent director
and grey director (non-executive non-independent) affects firm performance. The
authors examined the relationship between outside directors and the efficacy of the
boards of 157 non-financial Indian firms. These firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange
in the year 2008. The data obtained and extracted from the Prowess database of Centre
for Monitoring Indian Economy and corporate governance reports annexed to annual
reports. The authors revealed that the proportion of grey directors on the board has
marginally deteriorated effect on firm value, whereas the proportion of independent
directors has an insignificant positive impact on market value of forms (Kumar & Singh,
2012). Therefore, the independent directors should have a greater representation on the
board instead of other non-executive outside directors. Using a sample of 333 publicly
listed companies on New York Stock Exchange for a period of 3 years from 2009-2011,
Gill and Obradovich (2012) examined the effect of financial leverage and corporate
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governance on the value of American companies. CEO duality, insider ownership,
company size, the audit committee, returns on assets, and financial leverage were found
positively impact the value of U.S. firms, whereas the larger board size negatively
impacts the value of U.S. firms (Gill & Obradovich, 2012).
Mixed relationships. Garcia-Meca and Juan Pedro (2011) examined the effects
on Tobin's Q of several dimensions of ownership structure in Spain likely to represent
conflicting interests: These dimensions are ownership concentration, bank ownership,
and insider ownership. The authors used a sample of non-financial traded firms listed on
the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999-2002. Garcia-Meca and Juan Pedro found a
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, but the high levels
of large shareholder ownership negatively affect the market value.
Finally, Coskun and Sayilir (2012) investigated the relationship between
corporate governance and company value of Turkish firms using a regression model. The
authors found no significant relationship between corporate governance and company
value (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). On average, a sound set of corporate governance
policies, principles, and practices positively affects the company value; thereby the
companies should improve their corporate governance system before becoming
investable to maximize the market valuation gains. Good corporate governance standard
along with a dual listing in a country enhances a firm’s corporate governance, thereby
increase the market value (Ionescu, 2012).
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Transition and Summary
In Section 1 of this study, I addressed the fundamental issues that have led to the
need for corporate governance’s progress as an emergent demand. Furthermore, Section
1 covered the key reasons for examining the relationships of corporate governance with
corporate financial performance and market value in KSA’s publicly listed companies.
In Section1 I described the general problem and specific business problem of the study.
The general business problem is the controversial findings from previous studies failed to
provide consensus with respect to the relationships between corporate governance, and
financial performance and firm’s market value; these divergent findings may undermine
business leaders’ adherence and compliance with the best corporate governance practices.
The specific business problem is that some business leaders of KSA publicly listed
companies do not have sufficient knowledge of the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value to determine the
relevance and importance of developing and implementing corporate governance rules
and regulations.
The theoretical framework of this study is based on two theories: Agency theory
and institutional theory. The theoretical underpinnings of the study were addressed in the
literature review through 4 main parts that frame the research questions and hypotheses.
The literature review comprises (a) corporate governance theories, (b) the concept and
definitions of corporate governance, (c) corporate governance mechanisms, and (d)
corporate governance effect on financial performance and market value. In Section 2, I
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addressed the study’s proposed methodology to explain (a) research method and design,
(b) population and sampling, (c) data collection, (d) date analysis technique, and (e)
reliability and validity of the study. In Section 3, I presented and interpreted the findings
obtained from the data process and analysis. I also presented (a) the conclusions, (b)
applications to professional practice, (c) recommendations for actions and further study,
and (d) the implication for social change intended for improving business practice.
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Section 2: The Project
Proper implementation and sound enforcement of good corporate governance
mechanisms are very important for the survival and growth of publicly listed firms
(Mande, Ishak, & Idris, 2014). Robust corporate governance helps firms’ leaders to meet
their legal requirements and alleviate conflict of interests, as well as makes firms
attractive to investors’ capital. Examining and providing evidence on the relationship
between corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and firm’s
market value may enable firms’ executives to comply with the legal requirements of
capital markets and develop socially responsible behaviors, which in return may help
managers lower the cost of capital, and enhance market value and reputation for their
firms (Bonna, 2011). This section presents a detailed description of the proposed study’s
methodology and design features.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between KSA corporate governance variables and financial performance and
market value. The independent variables are corporate governance mechanisms (i.e.
board size, board independence, board committees, shareholding ownership structure,
and executive compensation) and the dependent variables are corporate financial
performance and market value. Data sources were KSA Tadawul lists and other public
records of 91 of the 116 companies for the years 2010-2014. Findings from this study are
to help firms’ leaders and boards to understand which variables are related to enhancing
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their companies’ performance and market value. Also, the legislators may benefit from
the findings of this study in identifying the corporate governance mechanisms that can
promote economic growth for the benefit of society.
Role of the Researcher
My role as the researcher was to (a) select the topic, (b) design the study, (c)
collect the data, (d) provide peer-reviewed or seminal sources, and (e) plan the approach,
as well as present (a) the summary, (b) conclusion, (c) recommendations, and (d) the
social implications of the study integrated with the conclusion. The population for this
study was the publicly listed companies in KSA for the time period 2010 to 2014. The
choice of study sample was based on the availability of corporate governance data and
trading years. Management scholars called this type of sampling non-probability of
convenience sampling (Berete, 2011; Parlalis, 2011). All the 116 firms were considered
for this study. However, I only used 91 firms because 25 of them have become publicly
traded firms after 2010. These 25 companies do not have their 2010 corporate
governance data and financial statements available. For multiple regression studies,
researchers suggest using Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) formula for establishing study’s
sample size: N > 50 + 8(m). N is number of selected firms, while m is number of study’s
independent variables. The sample size of this study should be at least: 50 + 8(5) = 90
samples. Therefore, the sample size of 91 firms was sufficient size for drawing
generalization about the study’s population as a whole.
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I worked independently to ensure that the data sources are reliable and valid, as
well as the collected data are analyzed, interpreted, and presented in an ethical manner.
The data of corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value
came from firms’ printed or electronic annual reports and the Tadawul website amongst
others. The biases in data collection can be avoided by clear and careful planning of data
collection process, using multiple sources of data, choosing sample representing the
population, and using proper measurement metrics. To ensure the reliability and validity
of data and information in this study, I used standard procedure to collect secondary data
and avoid the variation in collecting the primary data.
Researchers should fairly select the participants, protect the participants from any
harm, and ensure the confidentiality of participants. Also, researchers should be honest
and respectful to all individuals participating in the research (Berete, 2011). In this study,
no human participants were involved. Therefore, participants’ protection procedures and
documents, such as confidentiality protocols and informed consent forms, as well as
precautions for preserving the integrity and impartiality of participants were not required.
Because there were no participants in this study, the Belmont Report did not apply.
In the Section 3 of application to professional practice and implications for
change, I provided analysis descriptions and explained the characteristics of input
variables related to corporate financial performance and market value, and ensured
analyzing and interpreting the study’s data in an ethical manner. I have worked as CFO,
financial controller, finance manager, and auditor more than 24 years for various business
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organizations and have accumulated expertise in corporate finance, financial analysis,
corporate governance, and risk management; interfaced and experienced the corporate
governance systems and mechanisms, corporate performance, and market value issues
relevant to addressing the purpose and research questions for this study. This
accumulated expertise helped me better understand and facilitate the whole study. My
facilitating role ensured there was no bias to appear in data collection and sampling, and
statistical analysis and interpretation.
Research Method and Design
There are three different types of approaches for conducting studies: qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed methods. The three research approaches are considered in the
procedures of choosing a proper approach for this study. The selection of research
procedures should be in line with the research questions, therefore, the methodology may
be quantitative, qualitative or a mixture of both approaches (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013;
Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). The qualitative approach is appropriate if there have
not been any studies conducted on a specific social problem or the study variables are not
clearly identified. Quantitative approach helps test theories by examining the
relationships among independent and dependent variables; the quantitative approach
relies on collecting and analyzing numerical data (Berete, 2011). The mixed approach is
appropriate if either the quantitative or qualitative approach is not sufficient or adequate
to best address a specific research problem (Bonna, 2011). The qualitative approach was
not suitable for this study because the purpose of this study was examining the statistical

88
relationships of the variables, rather than examining themes based on interviews. The
mixed approach requires extensive data collection and the process for analyzing the data
is time intensive (Stanley, 2011). Therefore, the best way to examine the study’s
questions was to use a quantitative method with secondary data analysis. The key
characteristics associated with quantitative research are numbers, objectivity, and
generalizability.
Research Method
In this study, I used the quantitative correlational research method to test the
resulting hypotheses and answer the research questions. The quantitative research
method mainly focuses on hypothesis and theory testing (Singleton & Straits, 2005). In
quantitative research questions, researchers inquire about the relationships and
differences among variables while in quantitative hypotheses, researchers drive the
testing of the expected relationship among variables (Singleton & Straits, 2005; Wester,
Borders, Boul, & Horton, 2013; Young, 2011). Researchers use quantitative method to
examine the relationship among independent and dependent variables, which can be
measured through instruments and/or secondary data, so the data can be analyzed and
interpreted using statistical procedures (Singleton & Straits, 2005).
Pursuant to a post-positivist worldview, researchers use quantitative research to
examine the associations or relationships between independent and dependent variables
and pose the associations or relationships in terms of questions or hypotheses.
Quantitative research is deductive and starts with a general case, and then moves toward
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the specific (Singleton & Straits, 2005). According to the post-positivist worldview,
researchers use the quantitative approach to form the relationships between independent
variables and dependent variables as research questions and hypotheses, and then
examine these relationships (Berete, 2011). There was alignment between this study and
post-positivist worldview because the purpose for the study was testing the relationship
between the corporate governance variables and corporate financial performance, as well
as the relationship between corporate governance variables and market value of publicly
listed companies in KSA. Post-positivist assumptions are more appropriate for
quantitative methods than qualitative research methods. Therefore, a quantitative
research method was the most suitable method to address this study, because the focus of
the study was examining the relationship between independent variables (corporate
governance variables) and dependent variables (corporate financial performance and
market value).
Research Design
The most appropriate way to examine the relationship between corporate
governance variables and both companies’ performance and companies’ value was to use
a quantitative correlational research design. The focus of quantitative correlational
design is examining possible relationships among variables (Stanley, 2011). A
quantitative correlational design aligns with post-positivist worldview (Singleton &
Straits, 2005). Post-positivist worldview is a good support for using scientific methods in
understanding a complex social problem through using numerical measures and testing
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hypotheses. A quantitative correlational design was best for the proposed study because
the purpose for the study was investigating the relationship among known variables
(Stanley, 2011).
The experimental design and quasi-experimental designs were not appropriate for
this study. The experimental design is suitable for researchers examining cause-andeffect relationships. The quasi-experimental design is appropriate when the researcher
wants assess the casual effect of an intervention on a target population of a study through
control groups (Hamoudi & Dowd, 2013). The significant difference between
correlational designs and both experimental and quasi-experimental designs is that
correlation design does not imply causation and establishing causality by the
manipulation of research independent variables is difficult or impossible (Stanley, 2011).
Accordingly, a quantitative correlational design best serves the investigation of the
relationship between corporate governance variables and both financial performance and
market value.
The independent variables in the regression model were corporate governance
mechanisms of (a) board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d)
executive compensation, (e) and ownership structure. The dependent variables in the
study were corporate financial performance and market value. I used ROA and ROE to
measure the corporate financial performance. ROA and ROE are the most popular valuebased measures of performance (Habbash et al., 2014; Taiwo Adewale & Adeniran
Rahmon, 2014). ROA determines a firm’s growth over the study period while ROE
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compares one firm's profitability against the other firms’ profitability for the same period.
ROA and ROE are frequently used by analysts and investors who perceive that the higher
return on equity and assets, the better the financial performance of the firm (Al-Matari et
al., 2014; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Vo & Nguyen, 2014). Tobin’s q was used as a
measure of firm’s market value, which is the most common measure in empirical
corporate governance research, because it considers the risk and is not as likely to distort
the findings as other accounting measures (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Habbash et al., 2014).
Table 1 presents a summary of the study’s independent and dependent variables names,
measurement types, scale types, and measurement scales. These data were important for
developing three multiple regression models of this study.
Table 1
Independent Variables, Measurement Types, Scale Types, and Measurement Scale
Measurement
type
Quantitative

Scale type

Measurement scale

Variable name
Board size

Ratio

Assigning 1 point to each board member

Board independence

Quantitative

Ratio

Board committees
Executive compensation

Quantitative
Quantitative

Ratio
Ratio

Ownership structure

Quantitative

Ratio

ROA
ROE
Tobin’s q

Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative

Ratio
Ratio
Ratio

The ratio of independent directors to the
total board members
Assigning one point to each committee
Total monetary and non-monetary benefits
issued to five senior executives
Total board members’ shares divided by
total shares
Net income divided by total assets
Net income divided by book equity
Market value of equity plus total book value
of liabilities divided by total book value of
assets

Population and Sampling
There were 163 companies listed on Saudi Stock Exchange. In this study, I
excluded the firms belonging to financial and insurance sectors. The exclusion of
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financial institutions and insurance companies was due to the different accounting
standards applicable to these companies, making it difficult to compare the financial
performance and market value against those of firms in other sectors (Ferreira Caixe &
Krauter, 2014; Moradi et al., 2012). I used the remaining 116 publicly listed companies
in KSA as the general population. The firms from the sample belonged to the remaining
13 sectors (Tadawul, 2015).
There are various sampling techniques, such as (a) purposive, (b) convenience, (c)
simple random, and (d) stratified random sample. The choice of the study sample was
based on the availability of the data and trading years. Researchers called this type of
sampling non-probability or convenience sampling (Berete, 2011). According to nonprobability sampling technique, researchers select studies’ samples based on their
convenient accessibility (Parlalis, 2011). The specific sample was 91 publicly listed
companies in KSA for the years 2010-2014. Newly established companies were
excluded from the sample of this study, because new companies do not have enough time
to implement corporate governance mechanisms (Bonna, 2011). In addition, new
companies’ financial performance can be negatively affected from cash flow problems
and poor financial stability as the leaders of these companies concentrate on growing the
business (Bonna, 2011). The companies with at least 5 years in existence are assumed to
have had sufficient time to implement corporate governance practices and improve
financial performance (Bonna, 2011). These companies tend to have more attention from
regulators, analysts, and outside parties, as well as the effect of their corporate
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governance practices are more directly apparent. The selected companies have become
publicly listed companies before 2010. The selection of 2010-2014 time frames was
motivated by the (a) availability of trading data and financial statements, (b) corporate
governance, and (c) financial data of population over the period of test, such as ROA,
ROE, and Tobin’s q. Corporate governance and financial data of the selected companies
are available on the websites of these companies and Tadawul. The fiscal year of these
companies is consistent with the calendar year and there was no change in their fiscal
year for those years under examination. Furthermore, these companies were listed on
Saudi Stock Exchange throughout all of the study’s years.
Ethical Research
Researchers are responsible for demonstrating their trustworthiness, and the
reliability and credibility of the methodologies they use in their research (Berete, 2011).
For this quantitative study, I developed an ethical approach that was applicable to every
stage of this study (Jondle, Ardichvili, & Mitchellach, 2014). Each of Walden’s doctoral
students must obtain proposal approval by Institutional Review Board (IRB) to gather
and analyze the required data for completing their studies. The key role of the IRB
members is to ensure the doctoral proposals meet the acceptability criteria of practices
standards and professional conducts, institutional regulations, and applicable laws
(Berete, 2011).
Data collection sources were from publicly financial reports available from
Tadawul and from the 91 KSA firms’ websites. The selection of the study data were by
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company name along with the Tadawul code, and then saving these data to a password
protected file and arranged by company name. No involvement of the human participants
in this study. Therefore, no need for participants’ protection procedures and documents,
such as confidentiality protocols and informed consent forms. For protection purpose,
these data were subject to strict security measures. I will store data files for a period of 5
years succeeding the publication of the study, and will thereafter delete the files.
Data Collection
This heading includes three subheadings: instruments, data collection techniques,
and data organization techniques. The instruments are tools to collect, determine, and
process the information and data gathered for the study (Hoffschwelle, 2011). The data
collection technique in this study is the method used to gather data for analysis and
interpretation through different secondary sources. Data organization techniques depict
the organization of the data for statistical analysis and interpretation.
Instruments
There are no generally accepted corporate governance mechanisms and
management scholars have used different corporate governance definitions,
instrumentations, metrics, and indexes in corporate governance studies. Consequently,
numerous definitions of corporate governance have emerged depending on the
researcher’s interest and purpose (Mulili & Wong, 2011). As a result, previous
researchers have used several instruments, indexes, and metrics to examine corporate
governance, financial performance, and market value to measure the variables. Since the
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study data were secondary, the data sheets were the instruments of this study for
reflecting the values of the independent variables. Therefore, the construction of a series
of indices and ratios was appropriate for the purpose of this study.
Various corporate governance indexes have been explored in the review of the
professional and academic literature of this study. G-index is becoming the most widely
used measure of corporate governance in the academic research because of its consistent
scores (Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2004). G-index construction is simple
and straightforward. Also, G-index is transparent and easily reproducible (Gompers et
al., 2003). Furthermore, G-index objectively reflects the relationships between the
corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and market value
(Bonna, 2011; Brown & Caylor, 2004). Based on the research questions and literature
review, accomplishing the purpose of this study required using different sets of indexes
following the equal-weighting approach used in G-Index construction (Bonna, 2011). In
this study, the index for each variable was calculated for each year for the time period
2010 to 2014 and added up to estimate the total score of each variable index, and then
divided by 5 years to calculate average score index. The measurement of the independent
and dependent variables are addressed as follows:
Board size. I developed a board size index values by assigning an equalweighted approach of 1 point for each board member. A board of seven members is
considered small and seven points were assigned; conversely, a large board size of 10
members was assigned 10 points (Dhamadasa et al., 2014; Reddy & Locke, 2010).
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Researchers argued that the size of the board of directors should be no greater than 8 or 9
members (Reddy & Locke, 2010; Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012). Larger board faces
coordination and communication problems and hence board effectiveness. Therefore,
small board size is expected to be more effective in monitoring corporate management
(Bonna, 2011; Vintila & Gherghina 2012).
Board independence. Board independence is measured as the ratio of nonexecutive and independent directors to the total number of board members (Pandya,
2011). In this study, an independent director was defined as the member who (a) was not
an employee in the company and/or its subsidiaries within the last three years, (b) did not
have any business relationship with the company, and (c) did not represent a major
shareholder of the company. A major shareholder is the shareholder who owns 5% or
more of the total shares of the company.
Board committees. Board committees were measured by assigning one point to
each independent committee. For example, a company with no independent committees
was assigned zero point. Conversely, a company that had four committees, namely
executive, auditing, investment, and nomination and remuneration committees was
assigned four points. The total score depends on the number of independent committees
a company had.
Executive compensation. Executive compensation is total of the financial
payments and non-monetary benefits provided to executives in exchange for their work
on behalf of an organization (Lin, 2010). In general, executive compensation packages
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include a mix of long-term incentives and short-term incentives; long-term incentives,
such as restricted shares and stock options while short-term incentives, such as salary,
benefits, annual bonus, and perquisites (Lin, 2010). The executive compensation was
measured by total financial payments paid and non-monetary benefits issued to five
senior executives who received the highest compensation. Saudi stock market’s
regulators impose using this measure for disclosing the executive compensations in the
annual report of firms (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).
Ownership structure. The ownership structure affects the presence of the
independence and professional education of the board of directors (Michal, Maria, &
Anna, 2011). There are several ways to measure the ownership structure, such as (a)
percentage of shares owned by all members of the board of directors by total shares, (b)
percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, (c) percentage of shares owned by
top five shareholders, and (d) shares owned by the five major families (Reyna, 2012). In
this study, based on the availability of the data, the ownership structure of a corporation
was determined by the proportion of shares owned by all members of the board of
directors by total shares.
Financial performance. Corporate financial performance was measured by
ROA and ROE. ROA is ratio or measure used to evaluate the profitability of a company.
A higher ratio means a higher profitability of a company. It is calculated as net income
by total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income by book equity; the higher the ratio, the
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greater the rate of return investors is earning (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Dimitropoulos &
Tsagkanos, 2012).
Market value. Market value of a firm was measured by Tobin’s q, which is the
most common measure in empirical corporate governance research. Tobin’s q is the
market value of equity plus total book value of liabilities divided by total book value of
assets. Market value of equity is the number of shares multiplied by the closing price per
share (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).
Data Collection Techniques
The collection of the financial statements and corporate governance factors of
each sampled firm was public documents, including annual reports, Tadawul, and
company’s website for a 5-year period from January 2010 to December 2014 financial
years. I used content analysis techniques to analyze the available data (Bonna, 2011).
Content analysis is a method for studying the communication content; these techniques
include empirical measurement and theoretical definition. The purpose of using content
analysis is to create objective and systematic criteria for transforming written text in
highly reliable data that can be analyzed for the symbolic content of communication
(Bonna, 2011; Simmons, Conlon, Mukhopadhyay, & Yang, 2011). The financial
statements included balance sheets and income statements. The collections of corporate
governance factors were from the annual reports; these factors, for example, are (a) board
size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) executive compensation, and (e)
ownership structure. The collection of financial information, such as (a) net income, (b)
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company’s capital, (c) common stocks, (d), and total value of assets were from financial
statements. Combining the collected data is a necessary step to create indexes, scores,
and ratios. The indexes, ratios, and scales help condense the data collected by multiple
indicators into a scale score and single number. These data and information serve as
excellent tools that enabled me to examine the relationship between corporate governance
and both financial performance and market value.
Data Organization Techniques
The data sources for this study included Tadawul filings for the fiscal years 2010
through 2014 and annual reports for the sample firms. Organizing the data is an
important step for developing several statistics that describe and summarize the important
characteristics of the data sets. The next step was standardizing the organized data and
identifying their importance for addressing the research questions by testing the
hypotheses. Exporting study data into a spreadsheet was for further review and
calculation. The manual review of spreadsheet content was for avoiding any mistakes or
duplication of the independent and dependent variables data. Excel spreadsheet is a good
tool for calculating (a) ROA, (b) ROE, (c) Tobin’s q, (d) mean, (e) median, (f) mode, and
(g) standard deviation.
I grouped all the study data by calendar year and labeled a worksheet for each
year, and then created a compiled worksheet for the 5 years. The data file included a mix
of both raw and transformed data, such as (a) firms’ board sizes, (b) board committees,
(c) ROA, (d) ROE, and (e) Tobin’s q. Organizing the data in a SPSS file was for
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statistical analysis. The SPSS file contained both descriptive and inferential statistics
regarding the financial performance and market value of the sampled firms. The
descriptive data included, for example, mean and standard deviation. Inferential statistics
included, for example, ANOVA analysis, t test, and multiple regression analysis. I
backed up the data on safe thumb drives, which will be stored in fireproof lockboxes for a
period of 5 years following the publication of the study. I will delete the data from my
computer using a freeware called CyberShredder. Only I had access to these data.
Data Analysis Technique
Prior to conducting multiple regression, I analyzed a simple correlation matrix.
This correlation matrix allowed me to accept or reject individual null hypotheses for each
of the mechanisms of the independent variable. The correlation matrix helped identify
which variables I should include in the actual regression analysis.
After collecting and analyzing the relevant data, and creating the appropriate
scores and index for each variable, I analyzed the data statistically. In order to test the
resulting hypotheses and answer the research questions, In Section 1, I developed the
theoretical framework based on agency and institutional theories to create a relationship
or linkage between independent variables of corporate governance and the dependent
variables ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q. I addressed the research questions and tested the
hypotheses using SPSS (20) multiple regression statistical software program.
Management scholars have used multiple regression models in corporate
governance studies to examine the relationship of corporate governance with corporate
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financial performance and market value. For example, Moradi et al. (2012) examined the
impact of corporate governance mechanisms and financing activities on companies'
performance using multiple regression models. Ibrahim et al. (2010) used multiple
regression models to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance. Rambo (2013) used multiple regression models to specify the relationship
between corporate governance mechanisms and the financial performance of commercial
banks. Martani and Saputra (2009) used multiple regression to examine the effect of
corporate governance on firm performance measured by economic value added (EVA).
Also, Bonna (2011) used multiple regression to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance.
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical tool for analyzing the data within
several types of designs for understanding the relationship between/among two or more
variables. In this study, the use of multiple regression analysis was to investigate the
relationships of corporate governance, financial performance, and market value in KSA’s
listed companies. The goal was to determine if sound corporate governance
implementation was correlated with a better corporate financial performance and market
value. The study model is given in the equation: Y= α +β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3+ β4X4 +. .
. βnXn + ε where Y is the dependent variable, X1. . . Xn are the independent variables, α
is the intercept and ε is a random error variable. The β1. . . βn are the beta coefficients
of the independent variables (Bonna, 2011).
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I used standard (simultaneous) multiple linear regression. I chose multiple
regression models after careful consideration of other quantitative tools choices including
correlation analysis, simple linear analysis, and ANOVA analysis of variance (Bonna,
2011). Correlation analysis and simple linear analysis examine the relationships between
only two variables (Rodriguez, Araneda, Pedraja, & Rodriguez, 2011). The choice of
multiple regression approach was mainly based on the purpose of the study and the nature
of the independent and dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis enabled me to
examine the strengths of relationships between the five independent variables and the
three dependent variables (Rodriguez et al., 2011). The generic equations for the model
are
ROA = α0 + β1.SIZE + ß2.IND + ß3.COM + ß4.OWN + ß5. EXEC + ε

(1)

ROA = α0 + β1.SIZE + ε

(2)

ROA = α0 + ß2.IND + ε

(3)

ROA = α0 + ß3.COM + ε

(4)

ROA = α0 + ß4.OWN + ε

(5)

ROA = α0 + ß5. EXEC + ε

(6)

ROE = α10 + β11.ISIZE + β12.IND+ β13.COM + β14.OWN + β15.EXEC + ε

(7)

ROE = α10 + β11.ISIZE + ε

(8)

ROE = α10 + β12.IND + ε

(9)

ROE = α10 + β13.COM + ε

(10)

ROE = α10 + β14.OWN + ε

(11)

ROE = α10 + β15.EXEC + ε

(12)
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TOBIN’S q = α20 + β21.SIZE+ β22.IND + β23.COM + β24.OWN + β25.EXEC + ε (13)
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β21.SIZE + ε

(14)

TOBIN’S q = α20 + β22.IND + ε

(15)

TOBIN’S q = α20 + β23.COM + ε

(16)

TOBIN’S q = α20 + β24.OWN + ε

(17)

TOBIN’S q = α20 + β25.EXEC + ε

(18)

Where, ROA is the return on assets, α0 = the intercept of the model, SIZE = board
size, IND = board independence, COM = committees, OWN = ownership structure as a
proxy for shareholder rights, EXEC = executive compensation, β1. . . β5 are the beta
coefficients of the regression model, and ε is a random error. I used the same
independent variables to determine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on
approximate return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s q, the other two dependent variables. I
used three types of statistical analyses: descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to
analyze the data, range, and standard deviation to measure the dispersion of the data from
their mean and inferential statistics of sampled firms using multiple regression
techniques.
ANOVA is a part of the output of the multiple regression. ANOVA helps identify
whether or not to reject the null hypotheses via the p value. The results produced by
multiple regression analysis are four main values: R2, F statistic, Beta weight, and t
statistic. The use of p values is to identify whether there is an overall statistically
significant linear regression relationship between independent variables of corporate
governances and the dependent variables of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q. The test of
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statistical hypothesis for the existence of a linear relationship between independent
variables and dependent variables is formulated as
H01: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 =β6 = 0
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero
H02: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0
Ha2: Not all the βi are zero
H03: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0
Ha3: Not all the βi are zero
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the conclusion would be that no linear
relationship exists between the independent variables and dependent variables (Bonna,
2011). However, if the null hypothesis is rejected the conclusion would be that there is
statistically significant linear relationship between the independent variables and
dependent variables in the model (Bonna, 2011). The multiple regression technique
automatically produces the t-statistics. Therefore, there were six t tests for each one of
the correlation coefficients to identify which independent variables explain the variation
in the three dependent variables values (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q). I used multiple
correlation coefficient determination (adjusted R2) to examine the overall percentage of
the variation in the dependent variable that was explained by the independent variables.
The null hypotheses of this study rejected if p-value is less than α, .05.
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Reliability and Validity
This heading includes means for assuring the reliability and validity of the study’s
findings, such as documenting the processes for collecting and analyzing the data.
Reliability is concerned about the precision of the study’s results, while validity is
concerned about the achievement of the study in accurately measuring what the
researcher set out to measure, or its accuracy (Bleijenbergh, Korzilius, & Verschuren,
2011). Furthermore, the assurance of reliability increases when the collected data are
from peer reviewed and scholarly business sources. The improvement of validity can
stem from the clear definition of the study goals and objectives (Hoffschwelle, 2011).
Reliability
Reliability is the consistency of scores and stability, consistency, and repeatability
of a measure to represent the scores of an item (Stanley, 2011). Reliability results from a
process that produces consistent, dependable, replicable findings and confirmed by
previous studies and past events (Hoffschwelle, 2011). Reliability should build upon the
measurement quality and accuracy. In the case of using multiple measurements, the
values of reliable measures are consistent, stable, repeatable, and accurate (Eeva-Mari &
Lili-Anne, 2011). Lack of reliability refers to chance error or random error (Eeva-Mari &
Lili-Anne, 2011). However, lack of reliability can also be related to the use of intra rater
variation, which may not be random.
The key reliability issue of this study was whether G-Index was reliable to
measure the robustness of corporate governance of publicly listed companies in KSA
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(Bonna, 2011). Previous studies provided several methods for measuring the strength of
corporate governance, however, the most commonly used has been the G-index because
of its consistent scores (Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2004). Furthermore,
collecting the data and information for supporting the business problem within the study
needs to be consistent in the study documentation process and technique (Hoffschwelle,
2011). I evaluated the internal consistency to determine if the collected data were
consistent and uniform throughout the data set. I reviewed processes and procedures
used for data collection to assure consistency (Schultes, 2011). The review of
consistency in data gathering is very important to ensure the gathering occurred in an
unbiased way. Also, gauging the consistency is a good tool to ensure the data will be the
same if it were to be gathered for a second time (Schultes, 2011). The coefficient of
determination (R2) is an important tool in identifying the degree of linear-correlation of
study variables (LaFalce, 2012). Finally, creating metric reliability is important for
creating validity, although a reliable assessment is not necessarily valid assessment and a
valid assessment is not usually reliable (Stanley, 2011).
Validity
The study validity refers to the extent to which certain measurement satisfies the
purpose for which it is selected (Stanley, 2011). This study used secondary data, because
I obtained the data from data bases and companies’ documents. There are two types of
validity: Internal and external. Internal validity confirms that the variations in the
dependent variable are due to variations in the independent variable (s), rather than from
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other external factors (Eeva-Mari & Lili-Anne, 2011). There was no consideration of the
internal validity for this study, because internal validity is only relevant for research that
addresses cause-effect of casual relationship (Berete, 2011; Bleijenbergh et al., 2011). I
examined external validity. In quantitative research, external validity is a key criterion in
determining the generalization of the findings of the research to the entire population or
to other samples (Eeva-Mari & Lili-Anne, 2011). For this study, inferential statistical
techniques including hypothesis testing and ANOVA were good statistical analyses for
making generalization about the study’s population as a whole.
In this study, I created a group of metrics following the G-index approach and
ensured the metrics covered all needed material for the study. The review of the study
data was to test whether the data set reflected data on financial performance, market
value, and corporate governance mechanisms to ensure the items measured the
hypothetical concepts consistently (Schultes, 2011). I used appropriate sampling
procedures and statistical tests, and reliable measurement procedures to avoid a type I and
type II errors for having statistical conclusion validity of the study. Improving statistical
conclusion validity requires selecting proper sampling procedures, proper statistical tests,
and appropriate measurement procedures of the study (George, 2011; Petter, Rai, &
Straub, 2012).
Multiple regression models’ validity was confirmed by addressing the underlying
assumptions for multiple regression analysis. The assumptions of multiple regression
models are (a) outliers, (b) linearity, (c) multicollinearity, (d) homoscedasticity, (e)
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normality, (f) and independence of residuals (Osborne & Waters, 2002). If the
assumptions are not met, the results may not be trustworthy, leading to under- or overestimation of effect size(s) or significance, or a Type I or Type II error. There are a
number of outlier tests, such as Dixon, Grubbs, Tietjen-Moore, Generalized Extreme
Studentized Deviate (ESD) tests. There are three key ways to detect non-linearity: (a)
using previous research or theory for informing current analyses, (b) examination of
residual plots, and (c) routine running of regression analyses that incorporate curvilinear
components. There are some analyses used to detect multicollinearity, such as the
variance inflation factor (VIF) and collinearity (collin) analysis. Homoscedasticity
assumption is verified or checked by visual examination of a plot of the standardized
residuals via the regression standardized predicted value and the Levene’s test.
Normality assumptions are tested by several ways, such as visual inspection of
data plots, kurtosis, and skew (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Researchers use several
nonparametric statistical techniques when the assumptions of a parametric statistical
technique are in doubt or not met, such as transformations or bootstrapping.
Transformations can enhance or improve normality, but make the interpretation of the
findings more difficult and complex. Therefore, researchers should use transformations
technique in a thoughtful manner. However, bootstrapping eliminates the need for data
transformation. For this study, when parametric assumptions such as normality of
homoscedasticity were not satisfied, I used bootstrapping. In such situation, it is useful
for computing bootstrap confidence intervals that do not depend on those parametric
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assumptions. Bootstrapping is a useful method for obtaining a more robust
nonparametric estimate of the confidence intervals (Bibbona & Ditlevsen, 2013;
Hashemi, Mousavi, & Mojtahedi, 2011; Preuss, Vetter, & Dette, 2013).
Transition and Summary
Section 2 started by restating the purpose statement and the reasons for
conducting this study. Section 2 presented (a) a description of my role as the researcher,
(b) the methodologies, (c) strategies, (d) techniques, (e) variables’ metrics, and (f)
reliability and validity of the study. Section 2 presented the reasons for selecting the
quantitative method to conduct this study. Furthermore, Section 2 addressed the reasons
for choosing the 91 publicly listed companies listed on Tadawul as the sample size from
January 2010 to December, 2014 financial years. The source of secondary data was the
Tadawul website and the sampled companies’ websites. Section 2 included a discussion
of the data collection techniques, the reasons for choosing multiple regression modeling,
as well as a description of the reliability and validity of the study’s instruments. Section
3 presented and interpreted the findings obtained from the data analysis, as well as
contained (a) summary, (b) conclusion, (c) recommendations, and (d) the social
implications of the study integrated with the conclusion.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
The relationship between corporate governance and both corporate performance
and market value of corporations has gained widespread prominence in the stock market
economy. Researchers examined this relationship; however, the findings are mixed and
not convergent as well as researchers have no concurrence toward these findings.
Researchers found positive, neutral, negative, and mixed relationship between corporate
governance and both financial performance and market value (e.g., Abels & Martelli,
2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova
,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd, 2012). This study was an
attempt to enhance the understanding of the relationships between corporate governance
and the financial performance and market value of the publicly listed companies in KSA.
The theoretical framework of this study is based on agency theory and institutional
theory. This section is organized into eight principal headings: (a) introduction, (b)
presentation of findings, (c) applications to professional practice, (d) implications for
social change, (e) recommendations for action, (f) recommendations for further study, (g)
reflections, and (h) conclusions.
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and (a) financial performance and (b) market
value in KSA from 2010 to 2014. The key target of this study was to clarify the
importance of corporate governance on corporate financial performance and market
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value. The aim of this study was to help firms’ leaders and legislators to understand
which corporate governance mechanisms influence companies’ performance and market
value, as well as economic growth of society.
In general, the findings of this study revealed a statistically significant
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and both corporate financial
performance and market value. However, the findings provided that not all the individual
corporate governance mechanisms had significant relationships with both financial
performance and market value. Board size had a positive significant relationship with
both ROA and ROA. However, board size had a negative significant relationship with
Tobin’s q.
The findings evidenced that board independence had a negative significant
relationship with ROA, whereas had an insignificant relationship with ROE and Tobin’s
q. Board committees had an insignificant relationship with financial performance and
market value. The ownership structure had an insignificant relationship with financial
performance and market value. Furthermore, executive compensation had a positive
significant relationship with financial performance, whereas had an insignificant
relationship with market value.
Presentation of the Findings
The key purpose of this study was to find answers to 12 research questions.
These 12 questions are
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RQ1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA?
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees and
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA?
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA?
RQ7: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ8: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and market
value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ9: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
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RQ10: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
RQ11: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding
ownership structure and market value for publicly listed companies in
KSA?
RQ12: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?
To answer the research questions, this section includes descriptive statistical
analysis, inferential statistical analysis, and detailed description of the study’s research
findings. I concluded data analyses using SPSS (20). The SPSS file contained both
descriptive and inferential statistics regarding the financial performance and market value
of the sampled firms. The descriptive data included, for example, the mean, standard
deviation, mode, and median. The calculation of the mean is the average of all
observations, which is the sum of the study’s observations in the data set divided by
number of these observations. Standard deviation expresses how much the variation of
the study’s observations. The definition of the mode is the number in the study
observations or data set that is repeated most often. Median is the middle number that
divides the data distribution into two halves. Both mean and median are useful in the
projection of the future results.
Inferential statistics included, for example, ANOVA analysis, t test, and multiple
regression analysis. ANOVA helps identify whether or not to reject the null hypotheses
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via the p value. A t test explains the variation in dependent variables and which
independent variable has explanatory power.
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Sampled Firms
The 91 sampled firms belonged to 13 sectors: (1) cement (9.89%), (2) building
material and construction (13.19%), (3) tourism and hotels (2.20%), (4) media (2.20%),
(5) transportation (3.30%), (6) real estate (4.40%), (7) multi investment (7.69%), (8)
information technology (3.30%), (9) power and utilities (1.10%), (10) retail (8.79%), (11)
petrochemical (16.48%), (12) agriculture (13.18%), and (13) industrial investment
(14.28%) sectors. Corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance data, and
market value data from January 2010 to December 2014 were collected from the websites
of the sampled firms and Tadawul. The sampled firms are listed in appendix A. The
heading of the descriptive statistical analysis presented (a) mean, (b) median, (c) mode,
(d) range, and (e) standard deviation of (a) ROA, (b) ROE, (c) Tobin’s q, and (d) the
study’s explanatory variables of sampled companies.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the 13 sectors of sampled firms
and their financial performance and market value. Financial performance was measured
by ROA and ROE, while market value was measured by Tobin’s q. The sectors that
experienced above average financial performance in the sampled firms had a higher ROA
and ROE. Likewise, the sectors that seemed to experience above average market value in
the sampled firms had a Tobin’s q of at least 1.00. On the contrary, the sectors seemed to
experience lower average financial performance in KSA’s market had a lower mean ROA
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and ROE. Also, the sectors experienced lower average market value had a lower mean
Tobin’s q. The higher ROA and ROE the better the financial performance the sector had.
Also, the sector with a Tobin’s q > 1.00 is an indication for sector growth.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Sampled Sectors
Sector
Cement
Building and construction.
Tourism and hotels
Publication and media
Transportation
Real estate development.
Multi investment.
Information tech.
Power and utilities.
Retail
Petrochemical
Agriculture
Industrial investment.

Mean
ROA
(%)
16.35
5.05
6.30
2.63
.90
7.19
-1.37
4.63
8.49
10.56
5.73
2.21
7.18

Financial
performance
Above average
Lower average
Average
Lower average
Lower average
Above average
Lower average
Lower average
Above average
Above average
Lower average
Lower average
Above average

Mean
ROE
(%)
20.08
7.61
6.95
4.86
2.32
8.53
-29.75
2.53
11.70
19.26
8.99
3.96
11.60

Financial
performance
Above average
Above average
Average
Lower average
Lower average
Above average
Lower average
Lower average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Lower average
Above average

Mean
Tobin’s
q
2.41
1.47
3.20
1.14
2.02
1.01
1.46
1.43
1.51
2.54
1.44
2.18
1.69

Market value

Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average
Above average

The mean ROA of the all sectors was 6.16%. The cement sector had the highest
ROA of 16.35% followed by retail sector of 10.56, power and utilities sector of 8.49%,
real estate development of 7.19%, industrial investment of 7.18%, and tourism and hotels
of 6.30%. Petrochemical, building material and construction, information technology,
publication and media, agriculture, transportation, and multi investment sectors had mean
ROA lower than the average of sampled firms. Among all sectors, multi investment
sector had the lowest mean ROA of negative 1.37%.
The mean ROE for all the sectors was 6.98%. Cement, retail, and power and
utilities sectors also had the highest ROE of 20.08%, 19.26%, and 11.70% respectively.
Industrial investment sector with mean ROE of 11.60%, petrochemical sector with mean
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ROE of 8.99%, real estate development sector with mean ROE of 8.53%, and building
material and construction sector with mean ROE of 7.61% had a greater than 6.98%
mean ROE. Tourism and hotels sector had almost the same mean ROE of all sampled
firms. Publication and media, agriculture, information technology, transportation, and
multi investment sectors had a lower than 6.98% mean ROE. The higher ROA and ROE
of above average can be resulted of high net income, efficient use of debts, and efficient
use of company’s current and noncurrent assets (Bonna, 2011).
The mean Tobin’s q for sampled firms was 1.80. Tourism and hotels had the
highest Tobin’s q of 3.20. Retail sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.54, cement sector with
mean Tobin’s q of 2.41, agriculture sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.18, and
transportation sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.02 had a greater than 1.80 mean Tobin’s q.
Also, all other sectors, including industrial investment, power and utilities, building
material and construction, multi investment, petrochemicals, information technology, and
publication and media sectors, had a greater than 1.00 mean Tobin’s q. Sector’s Tobin’s
q of 1.00 could explain that the market value of equity of that sector was higher than the
carrying value of its current and noncurrent assets, which is an indication of sector
growth and over average performance in terms of market value. It is noted that firms
with highest mean Tobin’s q do not necessarily have highest mean ROA and ROE. Table
3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sampled companies using the mean,
standard deviation, mode, and median.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Financial Performance, Market Value, and Corporate
Governance (n = 91)
M
Board size
Board independence
Board committees
Executive compensation
Ownership structure
ROA
ROE
Tobin’s q
Market value

8
78%
3
7.10 million
17%
6.16%
6.98%
1.80
10.11 billion

SD

Mode

Median

9
100%
3
1.15 million
9%
1.19%
1.19%
.87
2.67 million

8
82%
3
4.91 million
7%
4.97%
7.98%
1.37
1.72 million

1.48
18%
0.64
8.39 million
21%
9.97%
49.02%
1.21
33.20 million

The lowest ROA of sampled firms was negative 78%, whereas the highest ROA
was 44%, the range was 122%%. The mean ROA of these firms was 6.16%, the standard
deviation was 9.97%, the mode was 1.19%, and the median was 4.97%. The lowest ROE
for sampled firms was negative 984%, whereas the highest ROE was 57%, the range was
1041%. The mean ROE of the sampled firms was 6.98%, the standard deviation was
49.02%, the mode was 1.19%, and the median was 7.98%.
The best symmetrical distribution is achieved when the mean, mode, median are
equal. When the mean and the median are close together in distribution center, the
distribution will not be perfect, but roughly symmetrical. The mean, mode, and median
are different when the distribution is skewed. In a negative skewed distribution, the order
of the mean, median, and mode of central tendency from the smallest value to highest
value is the mean, median, and mode. Conversely, in a positive skewed distribution, the
order from the smallest to highest is the mode, median, and mean. The higher ROA and

118
ROE is an indication of a firm’s ability to generate internal funds for financing its assets
and operations.
The lowest Tobin’s q for sampled firms was .53, while the highest Tobin’s q was
9.44, the range was 8.91. The mean Tobin’s q of the sampled firms was 1.80, the
standard deviation was 1.21, the mode was .87, and the median was 1.37. 13% of the
total observations had Tobin’s q of lower than 1.00. Three observations had Tobin’s q of
1.00. Thus, 86% of the total observations had Tobin’s q of higher than 1.00. The higher
percentage of the higher Tobin’s q is a sign of firms’ growth and over average
performance in terms of market value. The highest market value in the study sample was
SR 334.50 billion, whereas the lowest market value was SR .19 billion, the range was SR
334.31 billion. The average market value of sampled firms was SR 10.11 billion, the
standard deviation was SR 33.20 billion, the mode was SR 2.67 billion, and the median
was SR 1.72 billion. Figure 1 illustrates that the market value of equity appeared to be
positively skewed with most firms in the study’s sample with higher market values.

Figure 1. The probability distribution of the market value of sampled companies.
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The smallest board size of sampled firms was three members, while the greatest
board size was 12 members, the range was 9. The mean board size was 8, the standard
deviation was 1.48, the mode was 9, and the median was 8. Figure 2 illustrates that the
sampled board size had a normal symmetrical distribution.

Figure 2. The probability distribution of the board size of sampled companies.
Board independence is very important corporate governance mechanism because
of its ability to help mitigate financial scandals and corporate failures. The lowest board
independence of sampled firms was 20%, while the highest board independence was
100%, the range was 80%. The mean board independence was 78%, the mode was 1 or
100%, the median was 82%, and the standard deviation was 18%.
The smallest board committees of sampled firms were one committee, while the
greatest board committees were five committees, the range four committees. The board
committees had a perfect symmetrical distribution with mean of 3, mode of 3, median of
3, and standard deviation of .64. The lowest executive compensation of sampled firms
was SR .32 million, while the highest executive compensation was SR 72.10 million, the
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range SR 71.78. Executive compensation seemed negatively skewed with a mode value
of SR 1.15 million, a median of SR 4.91 million, and a mean of SR 7.10 million with a
standard deviation of SR 8.39 million.
Descriptive statistics provided evidence to conclude that there were relationships
between the payment of executive compensation and both ROA and ROE. Additionally,
the ownership structure is very important corporate governance mechanism because the
ownership structure shapes governance system of any country and lays down the
discipline of managers, company’s objectives, and shareholder wealth. The lowest
ownership structure of sampled firms was 00%, while the highest ownership structure
was 96% and the range was SR 96%. Descriptive statistics showed a mean ownership
structure of 17%, a mode of 9%, a median of 7%, and a standard deviation of 21%.
Table 4 summarizes proportion of companies that implemented specific corporate
governance mechanisms using frequency distribution. The table illustrates the frequency
distribution of the companies that were above, equal, and lower than the mean of each
corporate governance mechanism. These descriptive statistics are a sign of companies’
compliance to corporate governance rules and regulations.
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Table 4
Frequency Distribution Table Shows Corporate Governance Mechanisms of
Study Sample (n = 91)
Corporate governance mechanisms
Proportion (%) of
firms with
corresponding
corporate governance
mechanisms
Above the mean
Equal the mean
Below the mean

Board size
mean (8)

Board
independence
mean (0.78)

Board
committee
mean (3)

Executive
comp. mean
(7.1 million)

Ownership
structure
mean (0.17)

49%
8%
43%

56%
0%
44%

22%
46%
32%

32%
0%
68%

40%
0%
60%

For board size, about 49% (n = 91) of the 91 sampled companies had a board size
more than the mean (eight members). About 8% of the companies had a board size equal
the mean, whereas 43% had a board size less than the mean. Therefore, most of the
companies had board sizes more than eight members during the study period. Similarly,
56% (51 companies) of the companies had non-executive and independent board
members more than the mean (78%), whereas 44% (40 companies) of the sampled
companies had non-executive and independent board members less than the mean.
I concluded from the descriptive statistics that 22 % of the sampled companies
had board committees more than the mean (3) and 46 % had committees equal the mean,
whereas 32% of the sample had committees less than the mean. Therefore, most of
companies believed that three committees are sufficient for helping board members take
right and efficient decisions. Furthermore, 68% of the companies paid executive
compensation less than the mean (7.1 million) believed that the less executive
compensation, the more financial performance a company would achieve. The last
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feature emerged from the descriptive statistics is that 60% of the companies had
ownership structure less than the mean, believed that the more ownership stakes in hands
of board members, the less financial performance and market value the company had.
Inferential Statistical Analysis of the Study Sampled Firms
This heading presents the relationships between corporate governance
mechanisms and dependent variables of the study. The heading includes the analysis of
the linear relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and dependent
variables, and then presents multiple regression findings and ANOVA tables. The first
subheading presents the relationship between corporate governance in KSA and ROA.
The second and third subheadings present the relationship between corporate governance
and both ROE and Tobin’s q respectively.
Before examining the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms
and dependent variables, I checked the multicollinearity among the independent variables
using multiple regression. Multicollinearity exists when two or more predictors in a
multiple regression model are highly related or correlated, as one independent variable
can be predicted from other independent variables. Multicollinearity is not a problem in
the multiple regression model if the tolerance static between two explanatory variables
falls above .40. Low tolerance means high multicollinearity and high tolerance means
low multicollinearity.
Table 5 presents the correlation of all the study explanatory variables for multiple
regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these variables. The table
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illustrates that multicollinearity does not represent a problem in the study. As per the
correlation matrix the highest correlation between two explanatory variables is negative
65.9% between board committees and ownership structure. The second highest pairwise
correlation between executive compensation and board size is 34.4%. Similarly, the
correlation between the board committee and board size is 13.7% and that of ownership
structure and board size is 13.1%. The pairwise correlation among the other explanatory
variables ranges from negative 1.4% to 11.7%. Therefore, including all the independent
variables in the multiple regression models would not lead to multicollinearity problem.
Table 5
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance Mechanisms

SIZE
IND
COM
OWN
EXEC

SIZE
1.000
-.105
.137
.131
.344

IND

COM

OWN

EXEC

1.000
.085
-.659
-.014

1.000
.051
.117

1.000
.052

.
1.000

I also checked the multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables by
VIF values. If the VIF values are approximately 1, the correlation or multicollinearity
among predictors may not cause a serious problem and the multiple regression model can
be used for the prediction between the independent and dependent variables (Bonna,
2011). VIF values ranging from 5 to 10 indicate high correlation between variables that
may be a serious problem. Table 6 contains VIF values for multiple regression models.
The VIF for explanatory variables are 1.166 for board size, 1.821 for board
independence, 1.053 for board committees, 1.815 for ownership structure, and finally
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1.142 for executive compensation. Based on these values, I did not find multicollinearity
problem in the multiple regression models.
Table 6
VIF Values for Multiple Regression Models
SIZE
1.166

VIF

IND
1.821

COM
1.053

OWN
1.815

EXEC
1.142

Corporate governance and ROA. The test of statistical hypothesis for the
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables
is formulated as
H01: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = 0
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero
I tested the relationship between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms
using multiple regression analysis. The R value explains the variation in ROA and the
betas explain which independent variables have explanatory power. The multiple
regression analysis was conducted using SPSS (20). The multiple regression results, the
ANOVA table, and the model summary for the multiple regression findings are included
in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9.
Table 7
Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

.663

SIZE
.130
.007

IND
-.133
.028

COM
.073
.111

OWN
.074
.222

EXEC
.130
.007
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Table 8
ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

df

F

5
449
454

9.825

F critical
value
2.2341

p
< .001

Table 9
Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA
Model
1

R

R Square

.314a

.099

Adjusted R
Square
.089

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.066793

Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if the corporate
governance mechanisms as independent variables predicted the ROA as dependent
variable. I used the standardized coefficients because the study’s variables were
measured in different units. Table 7 illustrates the standardized coefficients and p values.
The regression equation is
ROA =.130*SIZE - .133*IND + .073*COM + .074*OWN + .130*EXEC
Table 8 illustrates that p value of less than .001 is significant. The multiple
coefficient of determination R2 is .099 and adjusted R2 is .089. The adjusted R2 of .089
explains that approximately 9% of the variability in ROA is caused by the independent
variables, corporate governance mechanisms. The decision is to reject the null
hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and accept the alternative hypothesis.
Therefore, there is an evidence to confirm a relationship between ROA and at least one of
the five corporate governance mechanisms.
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A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the
regression formula would identify which of the coefficients are not zero. The beats
explain which independent variables have explanatory power. The relationship between
the board size of sampled firms and ROA is inconclusive. Board size hypothesis is
formulated as
H0: β1 = 0
H1: β1 ≠ 0
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board size (SIZE) is .007, which is below
the .05 significant level. The beta coefficient of board size is .130. Thus, a one-member
increase in the board size leads to a 13% increase in the ROA. Thus, I reject the null
hypothesis in favor of H1. Therefore, board size variable is statistically significant and
can be used to predict and explain ROA.
It is expected that board independence variable predicts ROA and increases
corporate financial performance. Board independence is hypothesized as
H0: β2 = 0
H1: β2 > 0
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board independence (IND) is .028, which is
below the .05 significance level. The standardized beta of board independence is
negative .133; so a one-unit increase in board independence leads to a 13.3% decrease in
the ROA. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that β2
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is not zero. Therefore, board independence variable is statistically significant and explain
ROA.
The impact of number of board committees on ROA is inconclusive. For board
committees the hypothesis is
H0: β3 = 0
H1: β3 ≠ 0
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board committees (COM) is .111, which is
above the .05 significance level. The beta coefficient of board committees is low of .073.
Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β3 is zero. Therefore, the number of board
committees is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain ROA.
It is expected that the higher the ownership stakes owned by the board member,
the better the ROA of a firm. Ownership structure is hypothesized as
H0: β4 = 0
H1: β4 > 0
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .222, which
is greater than the .05 significance level. The beta coefficient of the ownership structure
is only .074. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β4 is zero. Therefore, the
ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain
ROA.
It is expected that the greater the executive compensation, the lower the ROA of a
firm. Executive compensation is hypothesized as
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H0: β5 = 0
H1: β5 < 0
The multiple regression results in Table 7 show that the p value for executive
compensation (EXEC) is .007, which is less than the .05 alpha level. The beta coefficient
of the executive compensation is .130. Thus, a one-unit increase in board independence
leads to a 13% increase in ROA. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis that β5 is zero.
Therefore, executive compensation variable is statistically significant and can be used to
explain and predict ROA.
The multiple regression results showed that only board size, board independence,
and executive compensation are the significant variables that explain and predict the most
variation in ROA. The multiple regression results in Table 7 illustrate that board size and
executive compensation had positive relationships with ROA, whereas board
independence had a negative relationship with ROA. Board committees and ownership
structure had insignificant relationships with ROA. Board independence was expected to
have positive relationship and increase ROA, but the finding did not support that
expectation. Also, it was expected that the larger ownership of stocks in the hands of
board members increases ROA and the higher the executive compensation the lower the
ROA of the firm, but the regression results did not prove that expectations.
The lack of the relationship between board committees and ROA indicates that
shareholders are not interested in many board committees likely because of lack of
suitable coordination and overlapping of responsibilities and duties that can result in
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inefficiencies. Similarly, the lack of relationship between ownership structure and ROA
indicates that shareholders do not like excessive ownership stakes in the hands of board
members, which reduces corporate financial performance.
Figure 3 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals
approximately follow a straight line, which is an indication on the quality of the
regression model or the normal distribution is a good model for the data set of the study.

Figure 3. The normal probability plot of the residuals for ROA.
Regarding the relationship between all independent variables of corporate
governance mechanisms and ROA, the adjusted R2 of .089 was extremely low because
the adjusted R2 was below 20%. The insignificant variables were board committees and
ownership structure. I removed the two insignificant variables from the regression model
and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to determine if the amount of variance
in the ROA explained by significant independent variables increased.
Table 11 illustrates that the revised adjusted R2 with board size, board
independence, and executive compensation in the model was .083. Although excluding
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the insignificant variables from the model, the adjusted R2 was decreased at .083. The
adjusted R2 slightly decreased by .006 from .089 to .083. The revised adjusted R2 of .083
explains that about 8.3% of the variability in ROA is caused by the independent
variables, board size, board independence, and executive compensation. Table 10
illustrates the standardized beta and p values of the highest predictive variables. The
multiple regression model with the highest predictive power with ROA as a dependent
variable is
ROA = .143*SIZE - .174*IND + .137*EXEC
Table 10
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROA
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

SIZE
.143
.003

.050

IND
-.174
< .001

EXEC
.137
.004

Table 11
Model Summary for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROA
Model
1

R

R Square

.299a

.089

Adjusted R
Square
.083

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.066989

Corporate governance and ROE. The test of statistical hypothesis for the
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables
is formulated as
H01: β11 = β12 = β13 = β14= β15= 0
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero

131
The relationship between ROE and corporate governance mechanisms was tested
using multiple regression analysis. I conducted the multiple regression analysis using
SPSS. The multiple regression results, ANOVA table, and the model summary for the
multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14
respectively.
Table 12
Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

SIZE
.121
.012

.559

IND
-.095
.114

COM
.032
.482

OWN
.099
.100

EXEC
.204
< .001

Table 13
ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

df

F

5
449
454

11.753

F critical
value
2.2341

p
< .001

Table 14
Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE
Model
1

R

R Square

. .340a

.116

Adjusted R
Square
.106

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.099795

Multiple regression analysis was conducted to identify if the corporate
governance mechanisms as explanatory variables explained and predicted the ROE as a
measure of financial performance. Table 12 illustrates the standardized betas and p
values. The regression equation is
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ROE =.121*SIZE - .O95*IND +.032*COM + .099*OWN + .204*EXEC
Table 13 illustrates that the regression was significant (p < .001). The multiple
coefficient of determination R2 is .116 and adjusted R2 is .106. The adjusted R2 of .106
explains that only about 10.6% of the variability in ROE is caused by corporate
governance mechanisms as independent variables. The decision is to reject the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are not
zero. Therefore, there is an evidence to confirm a relationship between ROE and at least
one of the five corporate governance mechanisms.
A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the
regression formula would identify which of the slope coefficients are not zero. The betas
explain which independent variables have explanatory power. The relationship between
the board size of sampled firms and ROE is inconclusive. Board size is hypothesized as
H0: β11 = 0
H1: β11 ≠ 0
Table 12 illustrates that the p value for board size (SIZE) is .012, which is below
the .05 significance level. The beta coefficient of board size is .121. That means that a
one-member increase in the board size leads to a 12.1% increase in the ROA. Thus, I
reject the null hypothesis and accept alternative hypothesis. Therefore, board size
variable is statistically significant and predict and explain ROE.
It is expected that board independence variable predicts ROE and increases
corporate financial performance. Board independence is hypothesized as
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H0: β12 = 0
H1: β12 > 0
Table 12 illustrates that the p value for board independence (IND) is .114, which
is above the .05 significance level. The standardized beta of board independence is
negative .095. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β12 is zero. Therefore, board
independence variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and
explain the ROE.
The impact of number of board committees on ROE is inconclusive or not clearly
known. For board committees, the hypothesis is
H0: β13 = 0
H1: β13 ≠ 0
The beta coefficient of board committees is low of .032. The p value for board
committees (COM) is .482, which is greater than the .05 significant level. Thus, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that β13 is zero. Therefore, the number of board committees is
statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain ROE.
I expected that the higher the ownership stakes owned by board members, the
better the ROE of a firm.

Ownership structure is hypothesized as

H0: β14 = 0
H1: β14 > 0
Table 12 illustrates that the beta coefficient of the ownership structure is only
.099. The p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .100, which is greater than the .05
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significance level. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β14 is zero. Therefore,
the ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and
explain ROE.
It is expected that the greater the executive compensation, the lower the ROE of a
company. Executive compensation is hypothesized as
H0: β15 = 0
H1: β15 < 0
The multiple regression results in Table 12 show that the p value for executive
compensation (EXEC) is < .01, which is less than the .05. The beta coefficient of the
executive compensation is .204. Thus, a one-unit increase in executive compensation
yields a 20.4% increase in the ROA. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the
alternative hypothesis that β15 is not zero. Therefore, executive compensation variable is
statistically significant and can be used to explain and predict ROE.
The multiple regression results showed that only board size and executive
compensation are the significant variables that explain and predict the most variation in
ROE. Table 12 illustrates that board size and executive compensation had positive
significant relationships with ROE as the higher the board size and executive
compensation, the higher ROE a firm had. Board independence, board committees, and
ownership structure had insignificant relationships with ROE. Board independence was
expected to have a positive relationship and increase ROE, but regression results did not
support that expectation. Similarly, there was expectation that a larger ownership stakes
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in the hands of board members enhance ROE, but the regression results did not prove that
expectation. The results also did not support the expectation that the larger the executive
compensation, the lower the ROE of a company; the results revealed a significant and
positive relationship between executive compensation and ROE.
Similar to the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on ROA, the
insignificant relationship between board committees and ROE indicates that shareholders
are not interested in several board committees likely because of improper coordination
among board members and overlapping of duties that can result in inefficient decisions.
Also, the insignificant relationship between ownership structure and ROE indicates that
shareholders do not like high ownership stakes in the hands of board members, which
negatively affects corporate financial performance.
Figure 4 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals
looks fairly straight, which is an indication on the quality of the regression model.

Figure 4. The normal probability plot of the residuals for ROE.
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Concerning the relationship between all independent variables of corporate
governance mechanisms and ROE, the adjusted R2 of .106 was extremely low because
the adjusted R2 was below 20%. The insignificant variables were board independence,
board committees, and ownership structure. I removed the three insignificant variables
from the regression model and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to determine
if the amount of variance in the ROE explained by significant independent variables
increased.
Table 16 illustrates that the revised adjusted R2 with board size and executive
compensation in the model was .081. Despite excluding the insignificant variables from
the mode, the adjusted R2 was decreased at 0.081. The adjusted R2 decreased by .025
from .106 to .081. The revised adjusted R2 of .081 explains that about 8.1% of the
variability in ROE is caused by the independent variables, board size and executive
compensation. Table 15 illustrates the standardized betas and p values of the highest
predictive variables. The multiple regression model with the highest predictive power
with ROE as a dependent variable is
ROE =.148*SIZE + .205*EXECROE
Table 15
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROE
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

.682

SIZE
.148
.002

EXEC
.205
< .001
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Table 16
Model Summary for Significant Variables (n=91), y=ROE
Model
1

R

R Square

. .291a

.085

Adjusted R
Square
.081

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.101199

Corporate governance and Tobin’s q. The test of statistical hypothesis for the
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables
is formulated as
H01: β21 = β22 = β23 = β24 = β25 = 0
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero
I used multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between the
market value measured by Tobin’s q and corporate governance mechanisms. I conducted
the multiple linear regression analysis using SPSS. The multiple regression results,
ANOVA table, and the model summary for the multiple regression analysis are presented
in Table 17, Table 18, and Table 19 respectively.
Table 17
Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

< .001

SIZE
-.192
. < .001

IND
.002
.975

COM
-.057
.232

OWN
.044
.481

EXEC
.035
.485
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Table 18
ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

df

F

5
449
454

3.628

F critical
value
2.2341

p
.003

Table 19
Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q
Model
1

R

R Square

.197a

.039

Adjusted R
Square
.028

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.887193

Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if the corporate
governance mechanisms as independent variables explained and predicted the Tobin’s q.
Table 17 illustrates the standardized betas and p values. The regression is
Tobin’s q = - .192*SIZE + .002*IND -. 057*COM + .044*OWN + .035*EXEC
Table 18 illustrates that the p value of .003 is less than the .05 alpha level. The
multiple coefficient of determination R2 is .039 and adjusted R2 is .028. The adjusted R2
of .028 indicated a weak relationship and explained that only about 2.8% of the
variability in Tobin’s q is explained by corporate governance mechanisms as independent
variables. However, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative
hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are not zero. Therefore, there is an evidence to
support a linear relationship between market value and at least one of the corporate
governance mechanisms.
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A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the
regression formula would identify which of the slope coefficients are not zero. The beats
explain which independent variables have explanatory power. The relationship between
the board size and market value is inconclusive. Board size is hypothesized as
H0: β21 = 0
H1: β21 ≠ 0
Table 17 illustrates that the regression was significant (p < .001). The beta
coefficient of board size is negative .192. Thus, a one-member increase in the board size
leads to a 19.2% decrease in the ROA. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that B21 is not zero. Therefore, board size variable is statistically
significant and predict and explain Tobin’s q.
It is expected that board independence variable predicts Tobin’s q and increases
market value. Board independence is hypothesized as
H0: β22 = 0
H1: β22 > 0
Table 17 illustrates that the standardized beta of board independence is only .002.
The p value for board independence (IND) is .975, which is greater than the .05
significance level. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that beta coefficient is 0.
Therefore, board independence variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to
predict and explain Tobin’s q.
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The impact of number of board committees on Tobin’s q is inconclusive or not
clearly known. For board committees, the hypothesis is
H0: β23 = 0
H1: β23 ≠ 0
Table 17 illustrates that the beta coefficient of board committees is negative .057.
The p value for board committees (COM) is .232, which is above the .05 significant level.
Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β23 is 0. Therefore, the number of board
committees is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain Tobin’s
q.
It is expected that the larger the ownership stakes owned by board members, the
better the market value of a firm. Ownership structure is hypothesized as
H0: β24 = 0
H1: β24 > 0
Multiple regression results show that the beta coefficient of the ownership
structure is only .044. The p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .481, which is
greater than the .05 significance level. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that
β24 is zero. Therefore, the ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be
used to predict and explain the market value.
It is expected that the higher the executive compensation, the lower the market
value of a firm. Executive compensation is hypothesized as
H0: β25 = 0
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H1: β25 < 0
The multiple regression results in Table 17 illustrate that the beta coefficient of
the executive compensation is only .035. The p value for executive compensation
(EXEC) is .485 which is greater than the .05 significance level. Thus, I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that beta coefficient is zero. Therefore, executive compensation
variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to explain and predict Tobin’s q.
The multiple regression results showed that the board size only had a significant
but negative relationship with the market value, whereas board independence, board
committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation had statistically
insignificant relationships with the market value. Some results were contrary to my
expectation because the higher the board independence and the greater the stocks owned
by board members, the higher market value and vice versa. The results revealed that
executive compensation had an insignificant and negative relationship with the market
value. The expectation of relationship between board committees and Tobin’s q was not
clear, but the findings showed that the number of board committees had a negative
insignificant relationship with the market value of a firm.
Figure 5 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals
approximately follow a straight line, which is an indication on the quality of the
regression model.
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Figure 5. The normal probability plot of the residuals for Tobin’s q.
Concerning the relationship between all independent variables of corporate
governance mechanisms and Tobin’s q, the adjusted R2 of .028 was extremely low
because the adjusted R2 was below 20%. The insignificant variables were board
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation. I
removed the four insignificant variables from the regression model and re-conducted the
multiple regression analysis to identify if the amount of variance in the Tobin’s q
explained by significant independent variable, board size, increased. Table 21 illustrates
that the revised adjusted R2 with board size in the model was .031. The adjusted R2
increased by .003 from .028 to .031, which is still low. The revised adjusted R2 of .031
indicated a weak relationship and explained that only about 3.1% of the variability in
Tobin’s q is caused by the independent variable, board size. Table 20 illustrates the
standardized beta and p value of the highest predictive variable. The multiple regression
model with the highest predictive power with Tobin’s q as a dependent variable is
Tobin’s q = - .182*SIZE
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Table 20
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q
Intercept
S(b)
p-value

< .001

SIZE
-.182
. < .001

Table 21
Model Summary for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q
Model
1

R

R Square

.182a

.033

Adjusted R
Square
.031

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.885824

Board size had a significant relationship with the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q in the
study’s regression models. The indication is that board size is useful in corporate
governance studies. Conversely, the board committees and ownership structure had
insignificant relationships with the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q in all regression models.
The implication is that the number of board committees and ownership structure are less
useful in the studies of corporate governance. Executive compensation had a significant
relationship with the financial performance, but had an insignificant relationship with the
market value. Board independence had a significant but negative relationship with the
ROA, but had an insignificant relationship with the ROE and Tobin’s q. The
insignificant relationship between the study’s corporate governance mechanisms as
independent variables and measures of corporate financial performance and market value
as showed by the adjusted R2 indicates that other significant mechanisms were not
considered in this study.
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Interpretation of Findings
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships between corporate
governance mechanisms and financial performance and market value. In order to
examine these relationships and answer research questions, a theoretical framework was
based on agency and institutional theories to create a relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms as independent variables and the measures of corporate financial
performance and market value. Financial performance was measured by ROA and ROE,
while market value was measured by Tobin’s q. I conducted multiple regression to find
linear relationships between both financial performance and market value as dependent
variables and corporate governance mechanisms as predictors. I used correlation matrix
of the predictors and VIF values to check the correlation or multicollinearity problem
among predictors. Multicollinearity was not issue in the multiple regression models.
Also, I used the R value for explaining the variation in dependent variables and the beats
for identifying which independent variables have explanatory power. The findings of the
study are presented below.
Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance.
The first six research questions of the study address the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance for publicly listed
companies in KSA. The literature of corporate governance provided controversial
findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance and corporate financial
performance (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). The multiple regression analysis results revealed
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a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
financial performance measured by ROA. The p values at 5% level of significance and
adjusted R2 in Table 8 and Table 9 confirmed the existence of a positive significant
relationship between the study predictors and ROA. However, the findings revealed that
only board size, board independence, and executive compensation had significant
relationships with ROA. Also, the p values and adjusted R2 in Table 13 and Table 14
supported a statistical evidence of a significant relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and financial performance measured by ROE. However, I found
that only board size and executive compensation had significant relationships with ROE.
The regression results in Table 7 provided statistically significant evidence of a
positive relationship between board size and financial performance measured by ROA.
Similarly, the results in Table 12 provided statistically significant evidence of a
relationship between board size of sampled firms and financial performance measured by
ROE. The literature has not concurred on the relationship between board size and
corporate financial performance, which confirms my expectations that relationships
between the board size and both ROA and ROE are inconclusive. Some scholars found
an inverse relationship between board size mechanism and corporate financial
performance. Other researchers found that a bigger board size may result in higher
financial performance because of the different expertizes knowledge and skills of board
members. The findings of this study are consistent with some research findings that a
larger board size may increase financial performance.
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The regression results in Table 7 provided statistically significant evidence of a
negative relationship between board independence and corporate financial performance
measured by ROA. Conversely, the statistical results in Table 12 proved that board
independence had an insignificant relationship with financial performance measured by
ROE. There were mixed findings in the previous studies regarding the relationship
between board independence and corporate financial performance. Many researchers
found board independence increase financial performance, whereas others concluded
negative impact or no significant impact of board independence on firm performance
(Kumar & Singh, 2012). There are several reasons for these contrasting results, such as
performance measures, time frames, and differences in samples (Dimitropoulos &
Tsagkanos, 2012). I expected a significant and positive relationship between board
independence and corporate financial performance, but the statistical results proved
otherwise. I was surprised to find a negative relationship between board independence
and financial performance, thereby independent directors reduces firm performance.
The literature has not fully explored the relationship between the mechanism of
board committees and corporate financial performance. However, previous researchers
found positive effect of number of board committees on disclosure and transparency of
accounting information (Bonna, 2011). My expectation was that the impact of number of
board committees on ROA and ROE is not clearly known. The regression results in
Table 7 and Table 12 provided insignificant relationship between the mechanism board
committees and financial performance measured by ROA and ROE. The results are
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consistent with the studies on organizational behavior and management principles, as
several committees within a firm may lead to improper coordination, duplication of
duties, and high costs and inefficiency, thereby affect negatively financial performance
(Bonna, 2011).
The empirical research on the relationship between shareholding ownership
structure and corporate financial performance found a mixed relationship between
ownership structure and firm financial performance. I expected that a higher ownership
stake in hands of board members improves firm financial performance. Contrary to my
expectation, the regression results in Table 7 and Table 12 provided insignificant
relationship between ownership structure and financial performance measured by both
ROA and ROE. The findings indicate that investors dislike high ownership stakes in the
hands of board members, which reduce company financial performance.
The previous studies about the relationship between executive compensation and
corporate financial performance found mixed relationship between executive
compensation and financial performance. Some researchers found that the excessive
executive compensation could reduce financial performance; however, others found that
increasing executive compensation can directly improve firm performance based on
supervision mechanisms (Lin, 2010). I expected that the larger the executive
compensation, the lower the corporate financial performance measured by ROA and
ROE. Therefore, the positive significant relationship between executive compensation
and financial performance was not expected. However, the regression results indicated
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that the higher executive compensation can be used to attract, retain, and motivate
experienced executives, which affect positively corporate financial performance.
Regarding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA,
the combination of board size, board independence, and executive compensation as
supported by the adjusted R2 of 8.9% revealed a weak relationship, thereby there were
other useful mechanisms that were not involved in this study. Furthermore, the results
revealed that both board committees and ownership structure had insignificant
relationships with ROA. Also, the combination of board size and executive
compensation in their relationship with ROE as evidenced by the adjusted R2 of 10.6%
provided a weak relationship; so the findings proved that other useful mechanisms such
as leverage were not explored by this study as predictors.
In general, the relationships between all independent variables of corporate
governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance measured by ROA and
ROE were weak. The regression results of the relationships between the independent
variables and financial performance indicated that the adjusted R2 was below 20%.
Therefore, I excluded all insignificant variables from the regression models and reconducted the multiple regression analysis to determine if the amount of variance in the
financial performance explained by significant independent variables increased. The
regression results showed that no material change of the adjusted R2.
In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed significant relationships between
corporate governance and financial performance measured ROA and ROE. Board size
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and executive compensation had positive significant relationships with ROA, while board
independence had a negative significant relationship with ROA. Board committees and
ownership structure had positive but insignificant relationships with ROA. Board size
and executive compensation had positive significant relationships with ROE, whereas
board committees and ownership structure had positive but insignificant relationships
with ROE. Board independence had a negative but insignificant relationship with ROE.
Corporate governance mechanisms and market value. The study research
questions from 7 up to 12 focus on the relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA. The multiple
regression results evidenced that there was statistically significant relationship between
corporate governance and Tobin’s q. The p values at 5% significant and adjusted R2 in
Table 18 and Table 19 supported a statistical evidence of a relationship between
corporate governance and market value. The results supported statistical evidence of a
weak relationship between the predictors and Tobin’s q because R2 is only 2.8%. I only
found that board size had a significant but negative relationship with Tobin’s q. The
implication is that board size mechanism lowers a firm’s market value, which is
inconsistent with some of the previous studies findings (Bonna, 2011). Most corporate
governance scholars in the literature concluded that the corporate governance is an
important factor for the firm value. Most of researchers found a positive significant
relationship between corporate governance and firm value; whereas a fewer scholars
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found a mixed relationship (Berthelot et al., 2010; Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Gill &
Obradovich, 2012; Kumar & Singh, 2012).
The regression results supported a statistical evidence of a significant but negative
relationship between board size and market value. The previous studies have not
concurred on the relationship between board size and market value, which concurs with
my expectation that the relationship between board size and market value is inconclusive.
The corporate governance scholars have not concurred on one optimal size for board of
directors. Some scholars concluded that there is a negative relationship between board
size and market value, as a small board can help improve firm market value (Tai, 2015).
When the board members grow too big, boards become more symbolic, as the
incremental cost of poor communication may exceed the benefit associated with a large
board (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014). Fewer researchers found that a larger board may
provide better management supervision and access to a variety of resources (Brédart,
2014). The findings of this study are consistent with some research findings that a larger
board size may lower firm market value.
The regression results supported a statistical evidence of an insignificant
relationship between board independence and market value. Corporate governance
researchers also concluded mixed relationship between board independence and market
value. Some researchers found a positive relationship, whereas others concluded an
inverse or insignificant relationship between board independence and market value.
Some scholars consider board independence is a good mechanism in controlling the
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board and can mitigate the concentrated power of the CEO, resulting in better market
value. However, others believe that independent directors are more likely to align their
interests with the management, leading to lower market value (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).
The study’s findings are consistent with some previous studies’ results that there is no
significant relationship between board independence and market value.
In general, board committees are formed to help corporate directors to perform
and discharge their responsibilities and duties effectively, so committees help improve
the financial performance and market value of a company. The relationship between
board committees and market value of a company has not been fully studied in the
literature; however, Bonna (2011) concluded a negative relationship between board
committees and market value. The implication is that too many board committees
formed by a firm may lead to improper coordination among different committees and
inefficiency, resulting in less market value. My expectation was that the relationship
between board committees and market value is not known clearly. The regression results
provided a statistical evidence of a negative insignificant relationship between board
committees and market value. However, the findings of this study to some extent are
consistent with the findings of Bonna (2011) that there is a negative relationship between
the mechanism of board committees and market value.
The proponents of agency theory recommend a higher overlap between stock
ownership and business management to mitigate conflict of interest, leading to better firm
market value (Mangunyi, 2011). Therefore, my expectation was that a higher ownership
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stake in hands of board members increases firm market value. The regression results
provided a statistical evidence of an insignificant relationship between ownership
structure and market value. The previous studies produced mixed findings regarding the
relationship between the ownership stakes owned by board members and firm market
value (Leung & Horwitz, 2010). The findings of this study are inconsistent with agency
theory regarding the ownership concentration by board members, but the results are
consistent with the findings of some previous researches that the relationship between
ownership structure and market value is insignificant.
There were mixed results in the previous studies regarding the relationship
between executive compensation and firm market value. Some researchers concluded
that the higher executive compensation may reduce firm resources, leading to lower
market value. According to equity theory, excessive executive compensation may lower
the motivation of investors in buying a firm stock. However, some scholars found that
the higher compensation can be used to motivate experienced managers, leading to better
market value. Others found no relationship between executive compensation and firm
market value (Lin, 2010). The results provided a statistical evidence of an insignificant
relationship between executive compensation and market value. The expectation was
that the excessive executive compensation lowers firm market value, but the findings
proved otherwise.
In general, the relationship between all independent variables of corporate
governance mechanisms and market value measured by Tobin’s q was weak. The
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regression results of the relationship between the independent variables and market value
indicated that the adjusted R2 was below 20%. Therefore, I excluded all insignificant
variables from the regression model and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to
determine if the amount of variance in the Tobin’s q explained by significant independent
variable, board size, increased. The regression results showed that no material change of
the adjusted R2.
In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed significant relationships between
corporate governance mechanisms and market value. However, board size had a
significant but negative relationship with market value, while board committees had a
negative and insignificant relationship with market value. Board independence,
ownership structure, and executive compensation had insignificant relationships with
market value.
Applications to Professional Practice
The main purpose of this study was to enhance the understanding of business
leaders on the importance of corporate governance for corporate financial performance
and market value of the publicly listed companies in KSA. The findings of the study
were consistent with some previous research on the significant relationship between some
of corporate governance mechanisms and both corporate financial performance and
market value, showing significant, negative, and insignificant relationships as discussed
earlier. Also, the findings provided evidence contrary to the other previous studies.
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The findings of the study may help business leaders know which corporate
governance mechanisms affect their firms’ success and growth. This understanding may
inspire business leaders to comply with the rules and regulations of corporate
governance. Also, the legislators may capitalize on the findings in identifying the
corporate governance mechanisms that can enhance country’s economic growth. The
study provides an important knowledge for researchers, regulators, and investors to
enhance investment return, financial performance, and market value, as well as mitigate
corporate failures. These findings could reduce investment risk and increase investor
confidence in the companies’ performance. The findings can help shareholders invest in
firms that adopt and exercise the best practices of corporate governance. The investors
will properly and efficiently allocate the raised and investable funds to the more
compliant firms, resulting in better ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q. Thus, the non-compliant
companies to good corporate governance practices would find difficulties to raise capital
in stock markets and financial institutions. Therefore, boards of directors and executives
are enforced to comply and adopt the best practices of corporate governance to
effectively use corporate assets and mitigate conflicts of interest among different
stakeholders. That is, the compliance could help companies raise the fund required for
operation and expansion (Bonna, 2011).
Most studies revealed that the corporate governance is an important factor for the
overall growth of the firm performance, as well as the country’s economy. However, the
findings of some research on the relationships between corporate governance and firm
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performance and market value are mixed. Business leaders want more clear evidences
with respect to these relationships, which is the main responsibility of researchers. The
findings of this study represent a unique added value and benefits for business leaders
and investors, especially those working and investing in Saudi stock market, because this
research is one of the few studies examining the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and firm performance in terms of corporate financial
performance and market value in KSA.
Implications for Social Change
Because of the significance of the relationship between corporate governance and
corporate performance as discussed earlier, the implications of this study for social
change became more understandable and much clearer. This significance creates a place
for social change within a society. If the business leaders understood that the more
adherence to corporate governance, the better financial performance and market value,
they may increase their compliance to corporate governance.
The business leaders that endeavor to improve their firms’ financial performance
and market value without negatively affecting the different stakeholders, a positive and
significant correlation will attract and retain experienced managers and employees, as
well as capture potential investors, leading to a better society. Thus, this study supports a
need for more compliance by business leaders to corporate governance rules and
regulations for creating more positive and significant impact on beneficiaries such as
suppliers, customers, employees, and community as a whole. Therefore, through this
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study, I urge business leaders, regulators, investors, and other stakeholders to work
together to create a better community.
Along with commercial activities in decision making, I encourage business leaders
to consider the benefits of communities and society in which they work. This change in
business leaders’ decisions result in economic benefits and social change such as better
firm performance, developing capital market, and increasing employees’ job satisfaction
and job security. Thus, the compliance to corporate governance by business leaders as
clarified in this study has implications help build confidence in Saudi Capital Market, and
improve the lives of stakeholders and community in general, leading to positive social
change. Therefore, the findings and knowledge of this study may contribute to social change
by motivating and encouraging business leaders to increase their compliance to the best
practice of corporate governance, leading to better performance. In return, the enhancement
of firm performance could positively affect the community and create some social benefits
such as improvements in the lives of employees, suppliers, customers, investors, and
community in general.

In this study, the researcher stressed that a lot of benefits associated with sound
corporate governance practices for society and business. The knowledge and findings of
this study may result in a lot of benefits for community as well as investors and firms.
The benefits of the community or society include fighting corruption, encouraging more
investments, and developing capital markets. The benefits for firms and investors include
decreasing cost of capital, improving firms’ financial and non-financial performance,
enhancing firms’ reputations, impacting positively shareholders’ values, and lowering the
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risk. From more macro perspective, the implementation of knowledge and findings of
this study could affect a country’s financial stability, leading to economic growth.
Sustainability issue has become the vital factor for shareholders in making their
investment decisions. Sustainable development is built on sound corporate governance,
which balances between the economic growth and social pillars.
Recommendations for Action
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and (a) financial performance
and (b) market value in KSA. Some corporate governance scholars called for small
board sizes, more board independence, increase the number of board committees,
increase ownership stakes in hands of board members, and excessive executive
compensation. Similarly, some shareholders and legislators advocated for large board
size, decrease the number of board committees, greater concentration ownership stakes in
hands of board members, and less executive compensation. However, the findings of this
study were contrary to some of above assertions.
The findings provided that board size had positive relationships with financial
performance and market value. Board size is an important corporate governance
mechanism that could mitigate an agency problem. Board size is considered an
important factor of the effectiveness of corporate governance (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju,
2011). The findings proved that larger board size result in better financial performance.
I recommend that corporate governance regulators and organizers in Saudi stock market
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encourage and urge publicly firms to increase the number of their board directors to at
least eight members, which is the average board size of the sampled firms of this study.
A larger board size may provide better management supervision, access to more
resources and financial funds, and more experienced members, leading to better financial
results.
The findings provided evidence that excessive executive compensation increases
financial performance, although there was no evidence about the impact of executive
compensation on market value. I recommend that firms can use compensation schemes
for rewarding corporate executives financially to align firm interests with shareholder and
other stakeholders’ interests. These schemes should link levels of benefits and executive
compensation to corporate financial performance and market value. The big portion of
executive compensation must be “locked” in for a period above five years and based
upon the firm achievement in the long-term rather than the short-term performance.
The findings evidenced that board independence had a negative relationship with
ROA, but it had no relationship with both ROE and Tobin’s q, which is opposite of the
findings of some previous studies. Board independence improves efficient and effective
control on firm executives; the more board independence, the better firm performance.
Also, the increase of board independence guarantees more integrity of financial
statements, which reduces threat of bankruptcy and financial distress of firms. Consistent
with the most previous studies’ results and contrary to the study’s findings, I recommend
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that Stock Market Authority encourage firms to hire a larger portion of independent
board members to monitor firms’ activities.
Board committees ensure that corporate executives behave in the best interest of
the stakeholders. The findings of this study revealed that the number of board
committees had an insignificant relationship with financial performance and market
value. Based on literature review and experience, I recommend that Saudi firms should
reduce the number of board committees to a maximum of three. These committees are
executive committee, nomination and remuneration committee, and audit committee.
Each corporation should have its own corporate governance setting out clear
responsibilities of each committee to prevent duplication of duties and avoid improper
coordination among committees, leading to efficient decisions. Responsibilities also
should be broad of each committee to contain related areas. For example, an executive
committee can perform other functions, such as capital investment functions and strategic
planning. Furthermore, nomination and remuneration committee, and executive
committee should have at least one experienced member in their related area like audit
committee.
The last recommendation is that regulators should enact acts set forth stiff
penalties for noncompliance to corporate governance. The acts set forth harsh penalties
for both companies, and their officers and directors for noncompliance. Given the
demand for better corporate governance, defining good corporate governance to
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encourage and enforce them to make decisions in the best interest of the stakeholders.
These acts will balance the power between firms and stakeholders.
The parties should pay attention and capitalize on the findings of this study are,
but not limited to, academic researchers, regulatory bodies, business leaders, board of
directors, CEOs, CFOs, financial analysts, experts in the area of corporate governance,
and so forth. I will disseminate the results of this study through finance and accounting
periodicals, professional conferences and workshops, as well as informational meetings
with community forums and key decision makers. I will also publish the entire study in
ProQuest/UMI dissertation database.

Recommendations for Further Study
This research is one of the few researches investigating the relationship between
corporate governance and corporate financial performance and market value in KSA. As
discussed in previous sections, such as Applications to Professional Practice and
Recommendations for Action sections, the findings of this study were contrary to some of
previous studies and consistent with the others. This study has some limitations; which
can be avoided by the future studies.
The study used the available existing data, rather than primary data. The
available secondary data could be a potential source of errors, which may preclude the
results to be generalized to all population. Future studies can collect primary data
through interviews and surveys or making the necessary adjustments or recalculation to
corporate financial reports. The adjustments or recalculation to corporate financial
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reports to standardize accounting methods and practices may result in different
components in the financial statements, and consequently different results.
This study used ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q, which are accounting measures, for
measuring financial performance and market value. Scholars do not concur on specific
measures assessing corporate financial performance and market value. Future studies can
use market-based measures of financial performance and market value, such as economic
value added, equity prices, market value added. These measures may change the research
findings.
The focus of this study is on the internal processes of a company, rather than
external factors. The external factors play a significant role in firm performance.
Interest rate policy, foreign exchange, macro economy, inflation, and other external
factors may have a significant impact on firm financial performance and market value.
Future studies can use the external factors instead of the internal process of a company
for investigating their impact on financial performance and market value.
I only used five corporate governance mechanisms, which are (a) board size, (b)
board independence, (c) board committees, (d) ownership structure, (e) and executive
compensation in the current study. Future studies can use different mechanisms, such as
leverage, voting rights, dividend policies, takeover defenses, and number of board
meetings. Most of these mechanisms did not receive much focus and attention by
contemporary corporate governance researches and literature. Using different corporate
governance mechanisms may provide different findings.
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Reflections

I work as CFO for one of the biggest publicly listed companies in KSA. As a
practitioner in corporate governance field, I examined the relationship between the
corporate governance and financial performance and market value with preconceived
belief that corporate governance mechanisms are significantly and positively affect both
financial performance and market value. I used secondary data in the current study;
thereby my previous belief did not influence the findings. The findings of this study
revealed that some corporate governance mechanisms, not all, play a significant role in
firm performance.
In this study, no human participants were involved; thereby researcher had no any
possible effects on the participants. The DBA journey helped me to gain a new
knowledge and experience of different processes and techniques involved in conducting
this study. The findings of this study helped me to have an open mind with respect to the
importance of the relationship between corporate governance and both financial
performance and market value. Also, the findings of this study motivated me and create
an interest in conducting further research in the field of corporate governance considering
different sample, different corporate governance mechanisms, and different statistical
techniques to help improve business performance and environment.
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to identify if significant relationships existed between
corporate governance and corporate financial performance and market value in KSA’s
116 companies for the time period 2010 to 2014. The independent variables were (a)
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board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) shareholding ownership
structure, and (e) executive compensation, while the dependent variables are corporate
financial performance and market value. Standard multiple regression was used to test
these relationships.
The findings revealed that corporate governance has a significant role in
improving firm performance. The results indicated that leaders should consider good and
robust governance in the areas of mechanisms of larger board size, excessive executive
compensation, minimal number of board committees to improve corporate financial
performance. However, the findings revealed that smaller board size and greater board
independence may weaken financial performance. Larger board size and greater number
of board committees negatively affect market value. The negative relationship between
board independence and corporate financial performance is surprising result and contrary
to the findings of some previous studies. Other corporate governance mechanisms
considered by the study had insignificant relationships with financial performance and
market value.
In conclusion, the study findings regarding the relationships between the
individual corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in terms of financial
performance and market value are divided into three groups: (a) the significant
relationships, (b) the negative or inverse relationships, and (c) the non-significant
relationships. For the first group, board size and executive compensation had significant
relationships with financial performance measured by ROA and ROE. For the second
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group, which related to the negative relationships, board independence had inverse
relationships with both ROA and ROE, while board size and board committees had
inverse relationships with market value measured by Tobin’s q. For the third group,
board committees and ownership structure had insignificant relationships with financial
performance, while board independence, ownership structure, and executive
compensation had insignificant relationships with the market value.
Based on the literature review presented in Section 1and the findings of this study,
my recommendations are (a) publicly listed firms should increase the number of their
board directors to at least eight members, (b) firms should use long-term compensation
schemes for rewarding corporate executives financially to align firm interests with
shareholder and other stakeholders’ interests, (c) Stock Market Authority should pass a
law enforcing companies to hire a larger portion of independent board members to
monitor companies’ activities, and (d) in general, regulators should enact acts set forth
harsh penalties for firms and business leaders for noncompliance to corporate
governance. The implementation of these recommendations may improve financial
performance and market value, and creates a positive business environment and social
change via building a confidence in stock markets. In return, this would enhance the
wealth of stockholders and country’s stability. The results indicate a need for further
studies in corporate governance field, using primary data rather than secondary data,
market-based measures of financial performance and market value, external factors,
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rather than the internal processes of a firm, and different corporate governance
mechanisms.
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Appendix A: List of Sampled Companies
Serial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Name
Al Asmak
Al Maraie
Aljouf Agriculture
Anaam International Holding Co
Halwani Bros
Jazan Development Co
Nadec
Qassim Agriculture Co
Savola Group
Sharqia Development Co
Tadco
Wafrah
Al-Babtin Power & Telecom.
Al-Zamil Industrial Ivestment
Amiantit
Arabian Pipe
Middle East Especialized Cables
National Gypsum
Red See Housing Services
Saudi Cables Company
Saudi Ceramic
Saudi Industrial Development
Saudi Steel Pipe
Saudi Vertified Clay Pipe
AL-Jouf Cement Co.
Arabian Cement Co
Eastern Province Cement Co.
Saudi Cement Company.
Southern Province Cement Co.
Tabuk Cement Co.
The Qassim Cement Co
Yamama Cement Company
Yanbu Cement Co.
Al Abdullatif For Industrial Investment
Al Hassan Ghazi Co
Alsorayai
Astra Industries
Basic Chemical Industries
Fipco
National Glass Industrial Co
National Metals Manufacturing & Casting Co
Saudi Arabian Mining Company
Saudi Chemical Co
Saudi Industrial Export Co
Saudi Paper Manufacturing
Spimaco Addwaeih
Mobaily
STC
Zain
Al-Ahsa Development
Al-Baha Investment & Development
Aseer Company
Kingdom Holding

Code No.
6050
2280
6070
4061
6001
6090
6010
6020
2050
6060
6040
2100
2320
2240
2160
2200
2370
2090
4230
2110
2040
2130
1320
2360
3091
3010
3080
3030
3050
3090
3040
3020
3060
2340
1214
1213
1212
1210
2180
2150
2220
1211
2230
4140
2300
2070
7020
7010
7030
2140
4130
4080
4280
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54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Masafi Saudi Arabia
Saudi Advanced Industries
Saudi Industrial Services
Advanced Petrochemical
Allogeen
Methanol Chemicals Company
Nama Chemicals
National Industrial Company
Petro Rabigh
Petrochem
Sabic
Safco
Sahara Petrochem
Saic
Saudi Kayan
Siig
Sipchem
Yansab
Gasco
Saudi Printing & Packing Co.
Saudi Research & Marketing Group
Dar Al-Arkan For Real Estate Development
Riyadh For Development (Tameer)
Saudi Real Estate (AL-AKARIA)
Taiba Holding
Al Khaleej Training & Education
Aldress
Alfetahy Group
Jarir Marketing Co.
Mouwasat Medical Services
Othaim
Sasco
Thimar
Saudi Hotels And Resorts - Door Hospitality
Tourism Enterprises Co.
Saptco
Saudi Transport & Investment Co.
The National Shipping Co. Of Saudi Arabia

2030
2120
2190
2330
2170
2001
2210
2060
2380
2002
2010
2020
2260
2120
2350
2250
2310
2290
2080
4270
4210
4300
4150
4020
4090
4290
4200
4180
4190
4002
4001
4050
4007
4010
4170
4040
4110
4030

